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USE OF THIS VOLUME
Seminars and publications of the University of Kentucky College of Law
Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) are designed to assist
lawyers in maintaining their professional competence. The Office of
Continuing Legal Education and its volunteer authors and speakers are not
rendering legal or other professional services by their participation in
continuing legal education activities. Attorneys and others using infonna-
tion from UK/CLE publications orseminars must also fully research original
and current sources of authority to properly selVe their clients' legal
interests. The forms and sample documents contained in continuing legal
education publications are intended for use only in conjunction with the
professional services and advice of licensed attorneys. The legal research
discussed herein is believed to be accurate as of August, 1990, but is not
\Varranted to be so. All parties must cautiously consider whether a
particular form or document is suited to specific needs. Oral presentations
and written materials may contain expressions of opinion \Vhich do not
necessarily reflect the vie\Vs ofthe Office ofContinuing Legal Education, the
University of Kentucky, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or other govern-
mental authorities.
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ABOUT ...
_~UK_-----------CLE
The University of Kentucky College of Law, Office of Continuing Legal Education (UKlCLE) was organized in
1973 as the first permanently staffed, full time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It
endures with the threefold purpose: 1) to assist lawyers in keeping abreast ofchanges in the law; 2) to develop and sustain
practical lawyering skills; and 3) tomaintain ahigh degree ofprofessionalism in the practiceoflaw.Revenues from seminar
registrations and publication sales allow the Office to operate as a separately budgeted, self-supporting program of the
College. No tax dollars, bar dues or public funds are utilized in the operation of UK/CLE.
Seminars
UK/CLE provides a variety of convenient, practical seminars to satisfy the continuing legal education needs of
lawyers. Seminars range from half-dayprograms inselectedareas to in-depthprogramsextendingoverseveral days. While
most seminars are conductedat theCollegeofLaw inLexington, UKlCLEhas alongstanding statewide commitment. Since
its first year of operation, beginning with a criminal law seminar in Madisonville, Kentucky, the Office has continued to
bring high-quality continuing legal education to attorneys in every region of Kentucky.
Publications
Each seminar is acccmpanied by extensive speaker-prepared course materials. These bound course materials are
offered for sale following seminars and are consistently regarded as valuable, affordable references for lawyers.
Since 1987, UK/CLE has been producing a series of Practice Handbooks and Monographs. Each Practice
Handbook is an extensively referenced, fully indexed practice guide consisting ofseparately authored chapters, sequenced
for thecomprehensivecoverageofadistinctbodyoflaw. Theirformat allows for updating throughsupplements andrevised
indexes. Each Monograph is a concisely written practice guide, usually prepared by a single author, designed to cover a
topic of narrower scope than the Handbooks. They are convenient references on topics often not treated elsewhere.
Professional Management
UK/CLE serves the needs of the bar from its offices on the University of Kentucky campus in Lexington. Its staff
manages course registrations, publication sales, seminar and publication marketing, publication composition and printing,
and seminar and publication content planning, as well as budgeting, accounting and fmancial reporting. As an "income
based" program, UKlCLEts seminar tuitions and publication sales are budgeted to generate sufficient revenues for self
support.
Commitment to Quality and Creativity
UK/CLE is a member of the Association ofContinuing Legal Education Administrators (ACLEA). As such, UK!
CLE subscribes to the Standards of Operation for Continuing Legal Education Organizations, and the Standards of Fair
Conduct and Voluntary Cooperation administered under the auspices of the American Law Institute-American Bar
Association Committee on Continuing Professiooal Education. Throughout its existence UK/CLE has been actively
involved in the activities and services provided by ACLEA. UKlCLEts association with national and international CLE
professionals has afforded it the opportunity to continually reassess instructiooal methods, quality in publications, and
effective means of delivering CLE services at consistently high levels of creativity and quality.
An Integral Part or the Legal Profession's Tradition mService
An enormous debt is owed to the judges, law professors, and practitioners who generously donate their time and
talent to continuing legal education. Their knowledge and experience are the fundamental ingredients for our seminars and
publications. Without their motivation and freely given assistance in dedication to a distinguished profession, high quality
continuing legal education would not exist.
As a non-profit organization, UK/CLE relies upon the traditional spirit of service to the profession that attorneys
have soloogdemoostrated. We areconstantly striving to increase attorney involvement in thecontinuingeducationprocess.
Ifyou would like to participate as a volunteer speaker or writer, please contact us and indicate your areas of interest and
experience.
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PREFACE
Almost every attorney will, at some time in his or her career, be
called upon to handle an automobile accident case. In terms of volume
of cases, they outnumber all other personal injury actions combined.
This monograph addresses the basics of handling automobile
accident cases, and is addressed to several audiences: the new
lawyer; the experienced practitioner who seldom handles an automobile
accident case; and the attorney who has handled automobile accident
cases in other states, but is unfamiliar with the law and procedures
of Kentucky. It is hoped, however, that even the attorney who
regularly handles this type of case in Kentucky will find some items
of interest.
The monograph is written from the Plaintiff's perspective.
Hopefully, attorneys handling primarily defense work will find items
of interest, as well.
To some extent, the monograph follows the case chronologically.
It begins with the initial interview and the decision whether or not
to take the case. That decision, plus most of the steps which follow
in the case, are based upon the liability, damages, and insurance
available; and each of those substantive areas is considered in its
own chapter.
The balance of the monograph is more technique than law,
beginning with an attempt to settle the case, and ending with the
trial itself. Because of space limitations, sorne areas are treated
ix
rather briefly, and a few, such as appeals, are omitted entirely. It
is hoped, however, that this will prove a good starting point and a
valuable reference.
x
I. [1.1]
A.
THE INITIAL INTERVIEW
[1.2] CONDUCT OF THE INTERVIEW IN GENERAL
A copy of" the police report is a IImust ll at the initial interview.
Either the client or the lawyer should obtain it in advance of the
i ntervi ew.
The format of the interview is largely a matter of personal
style. One method which works well for many lawyers is to let the
client tell his story in his own words, with interruptions for
specific information, or to get the client back on track, only where
absolutely necessary. The lawyer should listen intently, and avoid
const ant not e t ak i ng •
This practice often helps relax the client, who is in unfamiliar
surroundings. By showing a genuine interest in the client, the
attorney can begin building the good relationship which will be
necessary duri ng the comi ng months or years. Most of the det ail s ca n
be gathered 1ater.
One fact which must be verified at the initial interview is the
date of the accident. The police report will virtually always show
the correct date, but the lawyer should make it a point to ask the
cl i ent anyway.
The lawyer will, of course, answer questions. However, one
question which cannot, and should not, be answered during the initial
interview is the settlement value of the case.
In some cases, the attorney will be prepared to accept the case
1
at the initial interview. He should discuss fees and expenses, and
obtain signatures on forms, as set forth below.
In other cases, the attorney will recognize that he will not be
handling the case. In these instances he must politely but clearly
inform the client about his decision. The lawyer should always
encourage a second opinion, but is under no obligation to suggest a
particular lawyer. He should tell the client that if a second opinion
is desired, the client should seek one immediately, before the statute
of limitations runs. To insure that there are no misunderstandings,
the lawyer may wish to follow up with a short letter confirming that
he has declined representation.
Finally, a situation will occasionally arise where the lawyer
needs more information to determine whether or not to take the case.
If this is the case, the lawyer should follow through promptly so that
both he and the client have a clear understanding as to whether
representation has been undertaken.
B. [1.3] SIGNING OF FORMS
The initial interview is the appropriate time for the client to
sign several forms. First among these is the medical authorization, a
sample of which is provided as a form.
Although the form states that a copy ;s valid, some doctors and
hospitals want an original signature. For this reason, it is a good
idea to get at least three or four of these signed.
Because many doctors and hospital s requi re a "fresh" dat e - - no
more than 60 or 90 days old - - it is common practice to leave the
2
date blank, filling in dates as necessary throughout the progress of
the case. This way the client does not have to sign new forms every
time information is needed. So long as the client understands and
consents to the procedure, there should be no ethical problem with it.
Where lost earni ngs, past or future, may be an el ement of
damages, a wage authorization, included in the forms, should also be
signed. If this form is used to get information in an attempt to
settle before filing suit, the employer should be requested to make
its reply on company letterhead.
Vi rtually all auto accident cases are handled on a contingency
basis. When the decision has been made to accept the case, a
contingency contract (see forms for a sample) should be signed.
Written contracts have long been customary in cont i ngency cases and
are now specifically required by Rule 1.5 of the Kentucky Rules of
Professional Conduct. The Rules of Profess; anal Conduct appear, in
their entirety, as Supreme Court Rule 3.130.
C. [1.4] DISCUSSION OF FEES AND EXPENSES
If the lawyer has accepted the case the client should leave his
office with a clear understanding of the arrangement as to fees and
expenses. This can be accomplished only through thorough discussion.
Typically, expenses will cause more misunderstandings than fees.
Even though the contract so provides, the lawyer should reiterate that
out -of -pocket expenses a re separate from and in addit i on to the fee
charged for the lawyer1s services. The amount of time devoted to this
subject will depend on the sophistication of the client.
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A middle ground must be reached on pre-authorization of
expenditures. On one hand, it is unworkable to require authorization
every time the lawyer makes a long distance phone call or obtains
copies of physicians· office notes. On the other hand, the lawyer
should never incur a major expense, such as hiring an expert witness,
without first discussing the matter with the client. Exactly where
the balance is struck depends on several factors, chief among them the
magnitude of the case. The attorney must spend his client·s money
wisely in every case, but particularly in the small ones.
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I I. [2.1]
A.
THE DECISION WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE CASE
[2.2] RAPPORT WITH CLIENT
Conventional wisdom requires the consideration of three factors
in deciding whether to accept a case: liability, damages, and
insurance. To this list should be added a fourth, perhaps the most
important of all: rapport with the client.
This does not mean that the client must necessarily be pleasant.
Inj ured persons are often ang ry or depressed. But if the 1awyer truly
dislikes or distrusts her client, she will seldom be able to do a
first-rate job for him.
This alone will occasionally be sufficient reason to reject an
otherwise meritorious case. The lawyer should do so as tactfully as
possible, and urge the client to seek other counsel immediately.
B. [2.3] LIABILITY
In deciding whether to accept the case, the lawyer will need to
make a tentative decision as to liability. Liability issues are
discussed in detail in Section III, below.
Although liability can never be 100% guaranteed at the outset, a
significant number of cases will have reasonably clear liability.
Among these is the common IIrear-enderll, particularly where the rear
driver admits that he was inattentive and that the front driver was
stopped.
A second class is the questionable liability case. Normally
these are questionable because of disputed or unclear facts.
Occasionally there will be a legal question as well, especially in
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developing areas such as dramshop cases. There is nothing wrong with
accepting these cases so long as both attorney and client have a clear
understanding of the hurdles to be overcome. Indeed, the attorney may
even file suit knowing the existing law is against her, provided there
is II ••• a good faith argument for the extension, modification or
reversal of existing law, and [the suit] is not interposed for
any improper purpose ••• 11 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
11.
Finally, there is the no-liability case. These should not be
accepted under any circumstances. A lawyer should never take a case
she would not be willing to take to trial, on the assumption it will
settle. Invariably, it will turn out to be the case which does not
sett 1e.
c. [2.4] DAMAGES
Like liability, damages are discussed in detail below. The
economics of practicing law require that the lawyer give some
consideration to the damages recoverable, in making her decision
whether to accept the case.
Most property-damage-only cases wi 11 simply not produce an
adequate return fOrom the time spent on them. Typically, these are
cases where an adjuster (from either the other driver's liability
carrier or the client's own collision carrier) has made an offer which
the client deems too low. Many of these cases are appropriate for
small claims court, where the client can have his day in court and
save some attorney fees in the process.
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D. [2.5] THE SMALL CASE
Most attorneys do occasionally take a small case, which would not
meet the normal criteria they would set. Many times these are
accepted as a service to a friend, a relative, a particularly likeable
or sympathetic individual, or a good client. This is commendable; but
the lawyer must remember that once she accepts the case, no matter how
small, the client is entitled to professional services, and not to
havi ng the fi 1e repeatedly rel egated to the bottom of the stack.
E. [2.6] COLLECTABILITY
Although it may not be adequate, there will be some insurance
coverage available in almost every auto accident case. Even where the
tortfeasor has no liability insurance, one's own clients will normally
have uninsured motorist coverage. Besides this, there are no-fault
coverage, collision coverage and underinsured motorist coverage - -
all discussed below.
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III. [3.1]
A.
LIABILITY ISSUES
[3.2] USING JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO DETERMINE LIABILITY
The experienced lawyer may occasionally have a simple liability
case where he knows all the law and understands all the elements which
he would be required to prove at trial. This is not, however, usually
the case, even for the experienced practitioner. To gain a sense of
direction in pursuing the claim it is advisable for all attorneys,
especially relatively inexperienced ones, to map out what needs to be
proven early in the case.
A suggestion is often made in criminal cases that the very first
research done in the case should involve drafting jury instructions.
This sounds like putting the cart before the horse, but actually is an
excellent method of organizing the investigation, discovery, and other
pre-trial steps.
The method also works well in civil cases. Having tentative jury
instructions in hand will allow the attorney to have a good idea as to
the el ements of the tort, and what he must prove.
The single best source for these instructions is Palmore's
Kentucky Instructions to Juries. The attorney will virtually always
have to go beyond Palmore to tailor the instructions to the facts of
his particular case.
B. [3.3] DUTY
Analyzing the elements of a vehicular accident case can be
somewhat like taking a refresher course in law school torts. The
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analysis begins with duty. Usually, but not always, the duty owed in
vehicular accident cases is to exercise ordinary care. This is the
care owed by the driver of a vehicle to other motorists on the road.
Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Kelley, Ky., 455 S.W. 2d 535
(1970).
There is also case law to the effect that only the duty of
ordinary care is owed by a motorist to pedestrians, and this duty will
normally appear in the jury instructions. See, e.g., Clem v. Ball,
Ky., 237 S.W. 2d 839 (1951). There are, however, so many
qualifications and exceptions to this rule that it is of little use.
Pedestrian cases require specialized research as to the duties owed to
the pedestrian.
The major exception to the ordinary care standard is in cases
involving common carriers, which owe their passengers the highest
degree of care. It should be noted that even common carriers owe only
the duty of ordinary care to other motorists; therefore, in a single
accident, a bus driver or cab driver may owe one duty to other
motorists on the road, and a higher duty to his own passengers.
Louisville Taxicab, supra.
C. [3.4] NEGLIGENCE
Negligence is, of course, the theory under which most automobile
cases are brought, and the word, in one of its forms, wi 11 appea r i n
the complaint. Conversely, the word will probably not appear in the
jury instructions; rather, they will be phrased in terms of duty and
breach of duty. Many automobile accident cases are tried, from start
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to finish, without mention of the word "negligence" - - a word which
probably would not have a precise meaning to the jury, anyway.
D. [3.5] NEGLIGENCE PER SE FOR VIOLATION OF SAFETY
STATUTE
Negligence per se is a concept which must be understood by
lawyers handling auto accident cases. Kentucky has long had the rule
that a violation of a statute regulating traffic is negligence per se,
and will impose liability if that violation is the proximate cause of
the accident. Jewell v. Dell, Ky., 284 S.W. 2d 92 (1955). Proving
violation of a safety statute will therefore get the lawyer at least
half way to a finding of liability in his favor. The other half,
causation, will normally be allowed to go to the jury. However, in
some cases, causation is so clear from the facts that the Court will
find that as a matter of law, thus entitling the plaintiff to a
directed verdict on the issue of liability. Davis v. Kunkle, Ky., 194
S.W. 2d 513 (1946).
E. [3.6] MINORiS NEGLIGENCE IMPUTED TO OTHERS
Imputed negligence is rare in Kentucky. The one departure from
this general rule which the lawyer handling automobile cases needs to
know is that the negligence of a driver under 18 is imputed to the
person who signed his driver1s license application. KRS 186.590.
Actually, the negligence in this situation will be imputed to both
parents; and, if that negligence caused the accident, the parents are
jointly and severally liable with the child for damages caused by the
negligence.
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F. [3.7] DRAMSHOP CASES
In any case where alcohol is involved, the lawyer should be alert
for the possibility of a dramshop action. The landmark case is
Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 S.W. 2d 329
(1987). The rule established is that a liquor licensee may be liable
in a case where the licensee served alcohol to a person actually or
apparently under the influence. It is important to note that this is
in a business setting only, and does not apply to a social host.
Also of note is Pike v. George, Ky., 434 S.W. 2d 626 (1968),
which leaves open the possibility of liability on the part of a
licensee which illegally serves alcohol to a minor. The relevant
statute here is KRS 244.080 (1).
G. [3.8] MISCELLANEOUS ACTIONS
The lawyer should be alert for miscellaneous actions which
occasionally arise from accident cases, sometimes alone, and sometimes
in combination with the traditional negligence case. One of these
would be battery, which, of course, would occur if someone were
intentionally struck with an automobile.
Another possibility is the product liability case. Sometimes a
defect in the automobile will be the sole cause of the accident.
Other times, the accident will be due to driver error, but a claim can
be made that, with proper construction of the vehicle, the injuries
would not have been so severe. This is the IIcrashworthinessll case
which has been attempted nationwide with varying degrees of success.
In any action which has a product liability component, counsel must be
11
familiar with the intricacies of the Kentucky Product Liability Act,
KRS 411.200 et. seq.
Lawyers are increasingly becoming aware of liability for
improperly designed, built, and maintained roads. Potential
defendants i n these cases i ncl ude the designers and bui lders of the
roads, the Transportation Cabinet (which cannot be sued, but must be
pursued through the Board of Claims), and municipalities. In the
latter case, the lawyer must be aware of KRS 411.110, which places an
extremely stringent notification requirement of 90 days on the
plaintiff. The case law has construed this statute very strictly, and
the lawyer must be careful to supply each and every piece of
information required under it.
H. [3.9] WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
Wrongful death act ions, unknown at common 1aw, are c reat ed and
controlled by statute. The attorney handling one of these cases must
immediately consult the wrongful death statutes, KRS 411.130 et. seq.
These statutes set forth the proper party to bring the action (the
personal representative) and the method of distributing the proceeds.
The single biggest area of departure from other cases, the damage
issues, are discussed below.
I. [3.10] COMPARATIVE FAULT
Most lawyers would probably agree that the most dramatic
overnight change in negligence law in Kentucky in the last one hundred
years was the advent of comparative fault. Comparative fault, which
replaced contributory negligence, first came to Kentucky in the
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landmark case of Hilen v. Hayes, Ky., 673 S.W. 2d 713 (1984). It has
now been codified as KRS 411.182.
Unlike Ohio, which has modified comparative fault, Kentucky has
pure comparative fault. This means that even if the plaintiff is 99%
negligent, he may still recover 1% of his damages from the other
negligent party. However, in any case where the best plait1tiff's
counsel can hope for is a small percentage of fault on the other
parties, he ought to be asking himself a number of questions, one of
which is whether he will be able to establish even that small
percentage of fault.
In what is being widely hailed as a victory for the plaintiff's
bar, a new wrinkle has been added. Now, the jury may receive not only
instructions involving comparative fault, but also an explanation from
counsel as to the effect of their allocation of fault. Young v. J. B.
Hunt Transportation, Inc., Ky., 781 S.W. 2d 503 (1989). In other
words, the lawyer may say II If you find Mrs. Jones to be 20% at fault,
you wi 11 be reduci ng her award by 20%". Th is is a rad i ca 1 depa rt ure
from the prior situation, where jurors were left to speculate what the
effect of their allocation would be.
J. [3.11] SEAT BELT DEFENSE
Besides comparative fault, which will be pled in virtually every
case and pursued in a fairly large percentage of cases, there are
other defenses which will arise from time to time. One of these is
the seat belt defense.
This is actually a hybrid liability and damage issue. Although
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Kentucky statutory law does not require the use of restraints by
adults, the defense is permitted to introduce evidence that the
failure to use an available seat belt is a IIsubstantial factor
contributing to cause or enhance the claimant's injuries ll • Wemyss v.
Coleman, Ky., 729 S.W. 2d 174 (1987), at 179.
Normally this testimony will be introduced through physicians,
virtually all of whom will concede that certain injuries probably
would not have been so severe had the plaintiff been wearing a seat
belt and harness. Either side may also introduce proof on the issue
from persons whose expertise is more directly related to the precise
issue, such as a biomechanical engineer. The words IIseat belt ll should
not appear in the jury instructions, but counsel will, in many cases,
be permitted to argue that the fai 1ure to use the seat belt caused or
enhanced the injuries.
K. [3.12] BLACKOUT DEFENSE
Even newer to Kentucky than the seat belt defense is the blackout
defense, which was introduced in Rogers v. Wilhelm-Olsen, Ky. App.,
748 S.W. 2d 671 (1988). In that case, the defense was raised because
the defendant had a condition, which had manifested itself at least
once before, which caused him to have blurry vision and become dizzy.
Defense counsel should note that this is an affirmative defense which
must be pled.
The defense applies to a variety of medical conditions which may
cause a person to IIblack out ll • The burden will be on the defense to
show that the blacking out was not reasonably forseeable.
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L. [3.13] STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A final, but obviously important, defense is the statute of
limitations. Until July 1, 1975, the statute of limitations in auto
accident cases was a relatively simple matter. Since that date,
however, when no-fault became law, the statute of limitations has
become highly complicated, unpredictable, and a trap for numerous
lawyers.
As of the writing of this monograph, the statute of limitations
for most auto accident cases appears to have "s tabi 1i zed" at two
years, but, for reasons set forth below, the lawyer should not wait
that long if he has a choice. It should be noted that the statute may
be extended by the payment of no-fault benefits. KRS 304.39-230 (6).
There is one exception to the two year statute of limitations
which is so pervasive that it effectively shortens the statute in at
1east hal f of all auto acci dent cases. That is, despite the two year
statute of limitations, the statute for a consortium claim arising
from an auto accident is but one year. Floyd v. Gray, Ky., 657 S.W.
2d 936 (1983). For this reason, plus the continuing unpredictability
the courts have shown on this subject, it is highly recommended that,
absent good reason to wait, cases should be filed within one year.
KRS 304.39-230 also provides statutes of limitations for related
claims (other than tort claims) which have been brought about by
no-fault. Again, the statutes and cases must be read carefully - -and
co ns e rv at i vel y •
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IV. [4.1]
A.
DAMAGES ISSUES
[4.2] PROPERTY DAMAGE
Technically, the measure of damages for property damage, such as
to a vehicle, is not the cost of repair, but rather the difference
between the value before and after the accident, not to exceed cost of
repair. Harlan Fruit Co. v. Kilbourne, Ky., 133 S.W. 2d 730 (1939).
Hopefully, in the relatively rare case where property damages are an
issue, a stipulation may be reached either as to the amount of the
damage, or that the reasonable repair cost will be accepted.
B. [4.3] MEDICAL BILLS, PAST AND FUTURE
Medical expense has always been a primary element of damage in
automobile accident cases. The Plaintiff should be compensated for
both past expenses and future expenses which may be expected to a
reasonable medical probability.
Under the no-fault law, which is explained in more depth below,
certain medical expenses may not be assessed against the tortfeasor,
but rather must be collected from the no-fault insurance carrier. See,
e.g., Carta v. Dale, Ky., 718 S.W. 2d 126 (1986). Even if this is the
case, establishing actual medical expenses is important. Among the
reasons for this are exceeding a no-fault threshold, and demonstrating
the seriousness of the injury, to increase compensation for pain and
suffering.
C. [4.4] LOST INCOME
The Plaintiff is entitled to recover income which he probably
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would have received, but for his injury. This is often relatively
straightforward for the employed person; past tax returns are useful.
For the self-employed person, on the other hand, the proof is
sometimes extremely involved in nature, and open to considerable
interpretation by the jury. Because lost income is cornpensable under
no-fault, some or all of these losses may be recoverable only from the
no-fault carrier, and not from the Defendant or his insurer. Carta v.
Dale, supra.
D. [4.5] IMPAIRMENT OF EARNING CAPACITY
While actual loss of income is the standard for those losses
occurring before the trial, impairment of earning capacity is the
standard for losses occurring after the trial. This is conceptually
different from, and considerably more complicated than, the concept of
lost income. In cases involving a person with a significant number of
years of probable work life left, serious consideration should be
given to hiring an economist to assist in presenting this figure to
the jury.
E. [4.6] PHYSICAL AND MENTAL PAIN AND SUFFERING
In many cases physical and mental pain and suffering is the
single largest element of damages. Like medical bills and damages
related to loss of income, the Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated
for both past and future pain.
The Plaintiff and the treating physicians are obvious sources of
evidence of pain and suffering. Sometimes, however, the most
effective testimony of all will come from what are known as
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before-and-after witnesses: lay persons who can testify as to obvious
changes in the Plaintiff's personality occurring after the accident.
Determining the amount of these damages is more of an art than a
science. The reported decisions in Kentucky are filled with challenges
to the damages set by the jury, both as inadequate and excessive. Most
decisions, in both categories, have allowed the jury award to stand.
See, e.g., Southard v. Hancock, Ky. App., 689 S.W. 2d 616 (1985).
Despite the great latitude given to the trier of the fact, there
are a few ground rules. The award will be set aside if, at first
blush, it appears to have been brought about by passion and prejudice.
Townsend v. Stamper, Ky., 398 S.W. 2d 45 (1965). Also, the
permanency, or lack of same, of an injury has been judicially
recognized as being important in setting damages. Tichenor v. Roll,
Ky., 253 S.W. 2d 13 (1952).
F. [4.7] "HEDONIC" DAMAGES
Some states have officially recognized IIhedonic ll damages, that
is, damages awarded for the loss of life's pleasures. Kentucky has
not yet recogni zed these damages, as such. Neverthel ess, many of th e
same principles can be effectively argued as coming under the heading
of mental suffering, long recognized in Kentucky.
G. [4.8] PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages have always been difficult to recover in
automobile accidents in Kentucky. Case law indicated that even
driving drunk did not necessarily constitute wantonness.
Now, by statute, recovery of punitive damages ;s even more
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difficult. KRS 411.184(2) provides:
A plaintiff shall recover punitive damages only
upon proving, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the defendant from whom such damages are
sought acted toward the plaintiff with
oppression, fraud or malice.
This would seem to virtually eliminate the possibility of
collecting punitive damages for anything short of intentionally
hitting a person with a car.
H. [4.9] LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
Consortium ;s statutorally defined as lithe right to the services,
assistance, aid, society, companionship and conjugal relationship" of
a spouse. KRS 411.145. Loss of consortium will normally be claimed
any time the primary plaintiff is married, and should be separately
pl ed.
I. [4.10] WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES
Wrongful death damages are also largely dependent on statute, and
therefore vary greatly among jurisdictions. While a detailed
discussion of these damages is beyond the scope of this monograph, it
should be noted that although the general wrongful death statute, KRS
411.130, does not specifically mention compensation for loss of
affection and companionship, the wrongful-death-of-a-minor statute,
KRS 411.135, does specifically mention these damages. Because of the
intricacies involved, wrongful death damages must be studied at some
length well before trial.
J. [ 4.11] APPORTIONMENT
A thorough understandi ng of apport i onment is essent i al to anyone
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handling accident cases. To oversimplify, Kentucky has, for many
years, generally followed the proposition that where more than one
tortfeasor is at fault, each should bear responsibility only in
proport ion t 0 his f au1t • Th erefor e, the r e has bee n 1itt 1e j 0 i nt
liability in Kentucky. This means that if a defendant partially
responsible is judgment-proof, that part of the judgment would be
uncollectable even if there is another, thoroughly solvent defendant.
The history of apportionment in Kentucky is strange, indeed.
Originally it stemmed from an ancient trespass statute, KRS 454.040.
For decades, that statute has been construed to allow apportionment
among joint tortfeasors in negligence cases, as well. See, e.g., Cox
v. Cooper, Ky., 510 S.W. 2d 530 (1974).
The· statute was also held applicable to defendants who had
settled by the time of trial, allowing defense counsel to point to the
lIempty chai rll and suggest that the defendant who had already settled
was primarily at fault. Orr v. Coleman, Ky., 455 S.W. 2d 59 (1970).
Next followed a series of opinions considering whether there was to be
apportionment where a defendant had been dismissed, where a tortfeasor
had settled prior to being sued, and where the alleged tortfeasor was
a thi rd party defendant only. The results of these cases were not
necessarily consistent with each other.
Now there is a statute which probably answers most, but not all
of the questions on apportionment. This is KRS 411.182, which
requires apportionment of fault among all relevent parties, including
lIeach claimant, defendant, third party defendant, and person who has
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been released from liability ••• 11
This statute solidifies preexisting law to the effect that the
plaintiff may recover from each wrongdoer only in proportion to the
fault of the wrongdoer. Pl ai nt i ffs I counsel must therefore be
extremely cautious in settling with any defendants before the entire
claim is settled as a IIpackage li •
K. [ 4.12] COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
The collateral source rule was established in Kentucky by the
cases of Conley v. Foster, Ky., 335 S.W. 2d 904 (1960) and Taylor v.
Jennison, Ky., 335 S.W. 2d 902 (1960). Basically, the rule stated
that the injured person was entitled to recover, from the tortfeasor,
his full damages sustained, despite the fact that he might have
a 1ready rec e i ved s orne benef its from i nsu rance or other sou rces. If
the plaintiff had used up accrued sick payor vacation pay, the sums
received from those sources were not to be deducted from the damages
recoverable from the tortfeasor. Davidson v. Vogeler, Ky., 507 S.W.
2d 160 (1974).
There have, however, been two important statutory changes to the
rule. The fi rst came as part of the no-fault law, whi ch stated that
the plaintiff was precluded from recovering, from the tortfeasor,
medical and wage loss benefits paid or payable by his own carrier as
basic reparations benefits. See, e.g., Carta v. Dale, Ky., 718 S.W.
2d 126 (1986).
The second important statutory change came in the 1988 General
Assembly, which enacted KRS 411.188(3). That statute provides:
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Collateral source payments, except life insurance,
the value of any premiums paid by or on behalf of
the plaintiff for same, and known subrogation
rights shall be an admissable fact in any civil
t ri a1•
That statute means that benefits received from, for instance, a health
insurance carrier, may be disclosed to the jury by the defense.
Unfortunately, the statute fails to specify what the jury is to do
with the information.
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BASIC INSURANCE CONSIDERATIONS'v. [5.1]
A. [5.2] COLLISION COVERAGE
With respect to collision insurance, and all other topics in this
section, only the tip of the iceberg is presented. A more thorough
discussion is simply beyond the scope of this monograph.
Collision insurance is important to the plaintiff himself, but
generally is of considerably less importance to his attorney.
Basically, it provides reimbursement to the plaintit"f for darnage to
his own vehicle, regardless of fault, less a stated deductible. The
adjustment of this loss often will have occurred between the client
and his own insurance company well before the attorney gets the case.
In some, but not all, cases the insurer will be interested in pursuing
its own remedy for reimbursement against the tortfeasor.
B. [5.3] LIABILITY COVERAGE
Liability coverage is, of course, that coverage which a driver
purchases to pay judgments and settlements to third persons, resulting
from his own negligence. In Kentucky, the minimum allowable liability
coverage is $25,000.00 per person and $50,000.00 per accident for
bodily injury, plus $10,000.00 for property damage. KRS 304.39-110.
It is worth not i n9 that if the coverage was purchased out of state
from a carrier authorized in Kentucky (which includes virtually all of
haterials appearing herein which are taken from Kentucky Motor Vehicle
Insurance Law, by Robert D. Monfort, are reproduced herein with
permlsslon of the copyright owner, The Harrison Company, Norcross,
Georgia.
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the major companies) that coverage will automatically be deemed to
provide at least minimum coverage, even if the face amounts are less.
KRS 304.39-100(2).
An important clause included in virtually all liability coverages
is the omnibus clause. This typically provides that coverage is
extended not only to the named insured, but also to anyone else
drivi ng the car with the named insuredls permission. Sometimes that
person then allows another person to drive the car, and permission
has, in some cases, been extended by the courts to include the
successive user and beyond.
There is also a second omnibus clause in most policies which
dovetails with the other type. That is, the named insured is covered
not only while driving his own car, but also while driving someone
else's car with that person's permission.
Therefore, if A drives Bls car and negligently injures C, C will
normally have two insurance companies available to pursue for
liability coverage. The coverage for B, the owner of the car, will be
primary, and if that is insufficient to cover Cas loss, C may then
turn to the insurer of A, the driver, for excess coverage.
Because of the importance of insurance in automobile accident
cases, it is highly recommended that insurance coverage be determined
prom pt 1y aft e r sui tis f i 1ed • Th i sinform at ion, inc 1udin9 a
determination as to whether any apparent insurer is denying coverage,
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is fully discoverable under CR 26.02(2). Normally this is done by
interrogatory, but if the situation promises to be complicated, it can
also be explored on deposition.
As stated above, this is only a fraction of the information
available on liability insurance law. An attorney handling auto
accident cases needs a thorough working knowledge, and should educate
himself through seminars or publications on the subject.
C. [5.4] UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
Because Kentucky law now requires proof of insurance in order to
register a vehicle, it would seem that virtually all drivers would be
insured. Unfortunately, this has not proven to be the case, and a
shocking number of motorists still somehow manage to drive without
insurance.
Because of this, an understanding of the uninsured motorist
coverage is necessary. This is a coverage which, although written by
the plaintiff1s own carrier, essentially steps into the position of
being the defendant1s liability carrier, if the defendant is
uninsured. If plaintiff1s counsel becomes aware, through the police
report or otherwise, that the defendant was uninsured at the time of
the accident, or the insurance company is disclaiming coverage, he
should immediately put his client1s carrier on notice. In fact,
specific notice provisions are contained in most uninsured motorist
coverages, and these have been strictly enforced by the courts. See,
e.g., Shipley v. Kentucky Farnl Bureau, Ky., 747 S.W. 2d 596 (1988).
Some policies also contain a requirement that the insured obtain the
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written consent of the insurer before filing suit against an uninsured
motorist.
Where an uninsured motorist coverage is applicable, plaintiff's
counsel will find himself negotiating with, and sometimes suing, his
client's own insurer. If suit becomes necessary, the plaintiff should
sue the uninsured motorist, personally; but, unlike the situation with
liability insurance, he may join the uninsured motorist carrier as a
party defendant. Puckett v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., Ky., 477
S.W. 2d 811 (1972). Once suit is filed, it proceeds much as if there
were a liability carrier involved in the defense. However, one of the
requirements is that the plaintiff establish that the defendant was,
indeed, uninsured. Motorists Mutual Insurance Company v. Hunt, Ky.
App., 549 S.W. 2d 845 (1977).
D. [5.5] UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
Underinsured motorist coverage is the newest major coverage in
Kentucky. Where the defendant has plenty of liability coverage in
relation to the damages sustained, underinsured motorist coverage is
unimportant. It becomes material only where the injuries are serious
in relation to the amount of liability coverage.
The coverage is included in a surprising number of policies
today. It may be shown on the declarations page as a separate
coverage, but may also be included in a broad definition of the term
uninsured motorist. Where there does not appear to be sufficient
liability coverage, the client's own policy must be examined extremely
thoroughly.
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Because of its relatively recent development, many coverage
issues are unresolved. The only help available, to date, from the
Kentucky courts at least, are the cases of LaFrange v. United Services
Automobile Association, Ky., 700 S.W. 2d 411 (1985) and Simon v.
Continental Insurance Company, Ky., 724 S.W. 2d 210 (1986). It is
reasonable to expect that, when faced with a coverage question, the
attorney may have to look to decisions from states other than
Kentucky.
E. [5.6] NO-FAULT COVERAGE
Sin c e 197 5, n0 - f a u1t has bee nth e 1awin Ken t uc ky • Th 0 ugh
roundly criticized by the plaintiffs· bar, no-fault has survived long
enough that it appears it will be around for the foreseeable future.
Well-qualified personal injury lawyers practicing in other states
sometimes appear to be intimidated by the Kentucky law. This should
not be the case. Although the statutes and the case law construing
them are, indeed, complex, all that is really necessary is to master a
few key concepts, and then handle more sophisticated questions on a'
case by case basis.
The heart of the law, which is contained in KRS Chapter 304.39,
is that it both adds to, and takes away from, certai n remedi es whi ch
were available under prior law. What it gives is the entitlement to
certain basic reparations benefits for medical bills, lost wages, and
assorted other items, up to a usual maximum of $10,000.00. These are
paid to the plaintiff by his own carrier, regardless of who was at
fault in the accident.
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What it takes away is, in essence, the ability to pursue two
particular types of benefits from the defendant or his insurance
carrier. The first of these is certain economic benefits, for medical
bills, lost wages, and the like, which are paid or payable as basic
reparations benefits. The theory is that the plaintiff should be able
to recover these from his own insurance carrier; and if, in violation
of the law, he has failed to purchase insurance, he is simply out of
luck. These restrictions are contained in KRS 304.39-060(2)(a).
The other significant limitation is on the right to sue for
non-economic damages such as pain, suffering, and mental anguish,
unless the injuries are serious enough to have passed one of the
statutory thresholds. These thresholds include death, permanent
injury, a fracture to a bone, $1,000.00 in medical expense, and
several others. These are listed in KRS 304.39-060(2)(b).
In practice, the vast majority of plaintiffs which the attorney
will encounter will be able to meet at least one of these thresholds.
This is particularly true since the $1,000.00 limit has never been
adjusted for inflation. In a case which does not meet any of" the
thresholds, but nevertheless appears to be meritori ous, the attorney
should explore the exemptions to the no-fault law. These are rather
numerous, but are beyond the scope of this work.
F. [5.7] NO-FAULT PROCEDURES
The attorney who has handled automobile accident cases in other
states, but is not familiar with no-fault procedure, does need to
alter his practice a bit with a no-fault case. The primary extra
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tasks he must perform are (a) making sure his client collects all
available basic reparations benefits; (b) making sure his client meets
a statutory threshold; and (c) making sure he understands the
settlement procedure under no-fault. These are examined, in order,
below.
It is crucial that the plaintiff receive, from his own carrier,
all the basic reparations benefits to which he is entitled, because he
cannot collect them from the defendant or the defendant's carrier.
See, e.g., Dudas v. Kaczmarek, Ky., App., 652 S.W. 2d 868 (1983).
A form, included herein, is used for this purpose. Often the
insured will already have submitted it, but if he has not, it should
be submitted promptly.
Once the form and the documentation have been submitted, basic
reparations benefit payments should begin. It should be noted,
parenthetically, that attorneys and adjusters alike often refer to
these payments as "PIP", standing for personal injury protection. If
the payments are not timely made, sanctions are provided by KRS
304.39-210. As to the threshold, plaintif'f's counsel must be
prepared, if the case reaches trial, to prove that at least one of the
thresholds has been met. This would normally be accomplished via
medical testimony that the plaintiff broke a bone, suffered a
permanent injury, expended over $1,000.00 in reasonable and necessary
medical expenses, etc.
The no-fault law has provisions whereby the no-fault carrier may
recover, through subrogation, from the tortfeasor or his carrier, the
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no-fault payments made. However, an important provision, which is
virtually hidden in the statutes, is that if the liability coverage is
insufficient to pay both the plaintiff and the subrogated no-fault
carrier, the plaintiff is paid first, with the no-fault carrier1s
subrogation rights attaching to only what ;s left of the coverage, if
anything. KRS 304.39-140(3).
These subrogation provisions often cause unnecessary confusion in
settling cases. Plaintiff1s counsel should be interested only in the
sums which his client is to receive. It is good practice, in all
letters and communications involving settlement, to state that the
amount demanded is the sum to be received by the plaintiff himself,
with subrogation, if any, to be handled separately between the
carriers. This eliminates much confusion.
Most liability insurers do, in fact, negotiate in this manner. A
few have the annoyi ng habit of offeri ng a lump sum of money, to be
split between the plaintiff and the subrogated no-fault carrier.
Counsel must be extremely careful in these situations to specify, with
all parties involved, exactly what sum of money is to be paid to the
plaintiff, and to further specify that the subrogated insurance
company1s name shall not appear on the check.
Besides the three departures from traditional practice stated
above, if the case is tried, one further modification from traditional
practice will be made. That is, the jury instructions must include
special interrogatories, itemizing each element of damages, so that
the trial court and, if necessary, apellate courts, may sort out
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exactly what the jury was awarding in each category.
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VI. [6.1]
A.
PRE-FILING PROCEDURES
[6.2] NOTIFICATION OF INSURER
A letter of representation should be written to the liability
carri er as soon as the case is accepted. This serves two purposes.
First, it will prevent the insurer from making any further direct
contact with the client. Also, in the rare case where the negligent
driver has failed to notify his own carrier, it will help to reduce
the chance that the carrier will disclaim coverage on grounds of lack
of notice.
B. [6.3] INVESTIGATION
Although methodologies will vary from lawyer to lawyer, all will
agree that promptness is the key. Particularly in cas'es with
significant liability questions, it is essential to investigate before
witnesses forget what they saw and the physical characteristics of the
accident scene change.
One thing that needs to be determined at the outset is what
photographs have been taken, and what need to be taken. There is a
box on the police report indicating whether or not photographs were
taken at the scene. This will normally depend on the seriousness of
the accident.
Obvious subjects for photography include damaged vehicles and
photographs of the victim(s) showing bruises, lacerations, etc. Items
to be photographed at the scene include damage to road signs and guard
rails, showing impact of the vehicles.
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Particularly in accidents which will present obvious liability
questions, it is good practice to visit the scene and speak to the
police officers early in the investigation. Often they will be able
to provide insights beyond what is shown in their report.
Witness statements should be taken as soon as possible.
Probably, the witnesses have already been interviewed (by telephone or
in person) by an insurance adjuster, but it is important to get an
independent st at ement •
Statement-taking techniques range all the way from tape recorded
statements to allowing the witness merely to write out his own version
of the incident. A method which has worked well for the author is as
follows: first, contact the witness, and make arrangements to take
the statement at the witness· convenience. Second, meet with the
witness and allow the witness to tell the story of the accident,
saving questions until later - - in a manner similar to that used in
the initial interview with the client. Next, write out the relevant
portions of the story longhand, writing only on every other line. The
last paragraph of the statement will read something like IIMr. Monfort,
attorney for Mary Jones, has written out this statement from
information I have given him. He has explained to me that he has left
large spaces between the lines, so I would have room to change
anything I felt was incorrect. 1I
Fi nally, present the statement to the witness for signature and
dating. Sometimes the witness will want to change something. This is
fine; allow him to do it in his own handwriting before signing the
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statement.
Another option is to use a law clerk or outside investigator to
perfonn the investigation. While this method has its disadvantages,
one of them cost, one advantage it does have is that in the rare case
that the witness disputes something in the statement, the investigator
will be available to testify, thus keeping the attorney out of the
awkward position of testifying himself.
C. [6.4] OBTAINING AND UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL RECORDS
A good set of medical records is necessary for evaluating the
case for negotiation (either with an adjuster or defense counsel) and
for trial preparation. In cases where the attorney is hired soon
after the accident, obtaining the records may be delayed a bit, simply
because they will not reveal much. In all other cases they should be
obtained early, using the authorization which was signed at the
initial interview, with the understanding that they will probably have
to be supplemented as the client1s medical condition changes, whether
for better or worse.
There are two basic types of medical information available. The
first is the narrative report, which the physician will, for a fee,
prepare especially for the lawyer. Typically, this is a one or two
page letter outlining history, physical examination and diagnostic
testing, diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis.
Narrative reports have the advantage of being succinct and
relatively easy to read, but they do not take the place of consulting
the actual medical records. Those records, which consist of
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physicians' office records and hospital records, must be reviewed in
detail as well. Sooner or later they will be available to defense
counsel, so plaintiff's counsel should review them early.
Because of the variety of injuries encountered, not even the most
experienced attorney will understand everything in every record. A
good basic grasp of the medical principles is, however, in all cases,
required. For the relatively inexperienced lawyer, there is no
substitute for taking the time necessary in researching medical/legal
texts, such as Gordy and Gray's Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine, to
learn the necessary medicine.
With experience, the lawyer will become increasingly familiar
with the more common automobile-accident injuries - - in particular
the IIwhiplash ll type neck injury and the low back injury, which may
range from the usually less serious sprain or strain to the herniated
disc. Of particular importance is understanding the various
diagnostic tests: the simple x-ray, the electromyogram (EMG), the CT
scan, the myelogram, the MRI, and others. At every opportunity, the
attorney should ask for help from physicians in explaining diagnostic
tests and other medical principles relevant to the case.
D. [6.5] CASE EVALUATION
Case evaluation is probably the single most difficult task for
inexperienced lawyers, and no lawyer ever entirely masters it. As in
the case of understanding medical records, there is no substitute for
experience. There is certainly no harm in presenting an unbiased
summary of the facts to one or more other attorneys for the; r
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evaluation. Some firms which do a volume of personal injury work,
both plaintiff and defense, regularly hold round-table discussions to
evaluate cases.
Probably the worst method commonly used in evaluating cases is to
multiply the medical bills by a given number. This may have limited
value in persuading an adjuster (particularly where there is little
else to talk about), but generally will have little impact on an
experienced defense lawyer, and probably even less on a jury. Some
cases have a value of 10, 20, or even more times the medical bills,
while others, particularly in difficult liability situations, are
scarcely worth twice the amount of the medical bills.
Rather than trying to prescribe a method for evaluating the case,
what is presented here is a list of factors which should be considered
in evaluating the case:
a) The liability situation, particularly with reference to
facts from independent eyewitnesses and physical evidence.
b) Whether the jury will like and trust the plaintiff.
c) Whether the jury will like and trust the defendant.
d) Whether the defendant is a IIdeep pocket II, such as a ut i 1ity,
corporation, etc., or an individual.
e) The medical diagnosis and prognosis, particularly with
respect to permanency.
f) Whether the injury is one which can be easily demonstrated,
such as a broken arm, or is more difficult to demonstrate, such as a
neck strain. Note that this is a particular challenge for the lawyer,
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because, ironically, broken bones often heal well, with little or no
residual problems, while soft tissue injuries tend to linger and cause
problems for years after the accident.
g) The effectiveness of the medical proof. This depends on
what the doctors say, but may depend even more on how they say it and
how credible they appear to be. A defense doctor who minimizes an
obviously serious injury rnay help the plaintiff1s case rather than
hurt it, because he undermines the credibility of the entire defense.
h) The amount of the medical bills, and the projected future
medical bills. If a large portion of the bills have gone for
diagnosis, rather than treatment, the defense will be certain to
emphasize this fact.
i) The impairment of earning capacity. This is important
everywhere, and is part i cul arly important i n an area such as where the
author practices, conservative and hard working, where jurors may be
reluctant to award money for pain and suffering but readily identify
with loss of earnings.
E. [6.6] SETTLEMENT
If the lawyer and the client are both satisfied that a settlement
offer, achieved after negotiation, represents fair compensation for
the injuries suffered, there is certainly nothing wrong with taking
it. In both financial and emotional terms, a settlement achieved
today may be better for the client than one which is ten percent
higher, achieved after two years of litigation.
Once suit is filed, however, preparation for trial, not
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settlement, should be the major focus. The better a case is prepared
for trial, the more chance there is of achieving a fair settlement.
Settlement of cases requires tenacity and hard work. The lawyer
should not expect to be able to hold back major items of proof and
still achieve a good settlement. Whether dealing with an adjuster or
defense counsel, he must be prepared to submit good documentation for
the settlement demand, in terms of medical bills, reports and records,
documentation of lost wages, and, at times, even case law supporting
his legal position.
Plaintiff's counsel now has a statutory tool to handle those rare
cases where the insurance carrier engages in practices which are
recognized to be unfair. This is the Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act, codified as KRS 304.12-230. Although the Act was
probably designed principally to aid claimants in dealing with their
own carriers, it can, in certain situations, be relevant with respect
to a liability carrier as well. State Farm Automobile Insurance
Company v. Reeder, Ky., 763 S.W. 2d 116 (1988).
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VII. [7.1]
A.
FILING SUIT
[7.2] DECISION TO FILE
There are several occurrences which may trigger the decision to
file. One of these is negotiations which have stalled, or an initial
offer which is so low that it is obvious that suit will ultimately
have to be filed, anyway. Obviously, another reason is an impending
statute of limitations. A refusal by the adjuster to disclose the
policy limits is, for many attorneys (the author included), an
indication that it is time to file. Finally, in the large case, it is
oft en a good idea to fi 1e short ly after the attorney ish ired. These
cases nearly always end up in a lawsuit, and there is no sense in
delaying the case even more by waiting to file.
B. [7.3] PLEADINGS
The Civil Rules permit a short, simple complaint, and there is no
reason not to use one, even in the maj or case. A s ampl e i s prov i ded
as a form. Only a few specific observations are necessary. Even
though it may not technically be a requirement, it is good practice to
affirmatively allege that a threshold has been met. Also, of
part i cul ar interest to counsel from other states, it sh oul d be not ed
that a particular sum of unliquidated damages may not be recited in
the complaint. CR 8.01(2).
In virtually every case, either a no-fault carrier or health
insurance carrier will have certain subrogation rights. Where this is
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the case, the plaintiff must notify the subrogation holders, and file
a list of the persons notified along with the complaint. KRS
411.188(4). A copy of this pleading is also provided.
C. [7.4] SERVICE OF PROCESS
Although certified mail service is authorized by the rules,
service by the sheriff is usually utilized in auto accident cases.
This is because if the defendant refuses to accept the certified mail
service, sheriff service will have to be utilized, and time will be
lost in the process.
In the case of a non-resident motorist, a special long-arm
statute makes service possible through the Secretary of State. KRS
188.020 and 188.030. In these cases, it is also good practice to
allege, within the body of the complaint, that the defendant is a
non-resident, and that service is made through the Secretary of State.
In the standard auto accident case, an insurance company will not
be a defendant. In special cases, however, such as where an uninsured
motorist carrier is sued, the method of service on the insured depends
on whether it is a domestic corporation (unlikely) or a foreign
corporation. See KRS 2718.5-040, KRS 304.3-230(4) and KRS
304.3-230(1).
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VIII. [8.1]
A.
DISCOVERY
[8.2] ELIMINATING "BOILERPLATE" DEFENSES
Although it appears to occur less often, probably because of Rule
11, the lawyer will occasionally receive an answer filled with what
appear to be irrelevant defenses, such as statute of limitations, lack
of jurisdiction, improper venue, etc. When this occurs, plaintiff's
counsel should move promptly to remove these defenses from the record.
To do so, she can send interrogatories, or perhaps better still,
requests for admission, asking defense counsel to explain the facts
and 1aw support i ng each of these defenses. More often than not, the
obviously inappropriate defenses will then be withdrawn. If not, they
will probably be stricken upon proper motion.
B. [8.3] USE OF INTERROGATORIES AND OTHER WRITTEN
REQUESTS
In general, interrogatories and requests for admission are a poor
method for obtaining information by the plaintiff in an accident case.
The answers are certai n to be written or reworded by defense counsel,
and permit no follow-up. There are, however, a few areas which do
lend themselves to the use of interrogatories. These are: insurance
information; information regarding expert witnesses; the identity of
eyewitnesses (which should also be explored on deposition); and
information regarding documents and other exhibits to be introduced at
trial. Interrogatories covering these subjects are enclosed in the
forms.
C. [8.4] DEPOSING THE DEFENDANT AND EYEWITNESSES
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Even where liability appears crystal-clear, deposing the
defendant is a IImust li • If nothing else, this will provide a look at
the defendant and provide valuable information as to whether he is a
party with whom the jury would identify at trial.
Questions asked at the deposition should include general
background questions, a driving history from the date of his first
drivers license (ask to see the current drivers license), a detailed
description of how the accident happened, including the weather, road
conditions, and condition of the vehicle, and questions regarding all
known witnesses. Since it is virtually certain that the defendant has
claimed negligence on the part of the plaintiff, it is also fair to
ask IIWhat, exactly, do you claim Mr. Brown did wrong?1I This will
sometimes bring an objection, but will almost always also bring an
answer. In a surprising percentage of cases the answer will be
II noth i ng II •
Unless she has an unusually good memory, plaintiff's counsel
should also make notes as to the defendant's appearance, demeanor,
etc. These wi 11 prove val uabl e at a 1ater date.
As to eyewitnesses to the accident, every effort should be made
to take a statement, rather than utilizing a deposition. If these
efforts fail, and the case has any chance of being contested on a
liability basis, these eyewitnesses must be deposed, and a subpoena
may be utilized if necessary to force them to testify.
D. [8.5] DEPOSING DEFENSE EXPERTS
Technically, a party does not have the right to depose an
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opposing expert. CR 26.02(4)(a)(i). In reality, however, this can
almost always be accomplished, either by agreement of the parties, or
order of court.
If the plai~tiff has submitted to an independent medical
evaluation by the defense, the defense is required to provide a
detailed report of the physician. CR 35.02(1). Normally, this report
will be sufficient, and it will not be necessary to depose the doctor.
Other defense experts may be utilized, including accident
r econ s t r uct ion i s t s, eng i nee r s, and e con om i s t s • A1m0 s t wit h0 ut
exception, these experts should be deposed, as the lawyer will not be
able to prepare sufficiently through the meager answers supplied to
i nterrogatori es.
E. [8.6] PREPAR I NG THE PLAI NTI FF FOR HIS OWN
DEPOSITION
Preparing the plaintiff for his own deposition is one of the most
crucial steps of the case. Some clients will obviously require more
time than others, but a substantial amount of time should be spent
with all clients.
The lawyer should develop some sort of brochure or handout to
mail to the client about a week prior to the deposition. The author
uses one of these, but has not provided it, because it was taken
almost verbatim from a book, and is probably protected by copyright.
Good forms for this type of handout appear in Handling Soft Tissue
Injury Cases, by Preiser and Preiser, Kluwer Lawbook Publishers, Inc.
and The Anatomy of a Personal Injury Lawsuit, Second Edition,
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published by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America Education
Fund. Whatever form is used, it should outline the deposition
process, and give specific recommendations as to truthfulness,
responsiveness, and general demeanor.
In addition to the use of the brochure, it is vital to meet with
the client immediately before the deposition, for as long a period as
is felt will be necessary. The lawyer should go through the brochure,
point by point, and answer questions. Emphasis, again, is on telling
the truth; making sure the deponent understands the question before it
is answered; being responsive, and not rambling; and on maintaining a
businesslike demeanor.
There are several suggestions the author makes to his client in
each of these sessions. One is IIDon't try to guess what answer I want
you to give, just tell the truth. If you try to guess, I guarantee
that you will guess wrong. 1I Another suggestion is to remind the
client that besides evaluating the answers, defense counsel is also
evaluating him. Therefore it is important to maintain the proper
demeanor.
Finally, it is a good idea to explain to the client that, while
plaintiff's counsel has the opportunity to ask questions himself, he
probably will not. One way to put it is liThe defense counsel will get
answers to 300 questions. Why should I make it 301 or 3021 11
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IX. [9.1]
A.
TRIAL PREPARATION
[9.2] IN GENERAL
Trial preparation actually began the day the client walked in the
door. What follows is a list, certainly not all-inclusive, of the
maj or tasks, other than di scovery, pl ai nt iff's counsel wi 11 be
accomplishing as the trial date approaches. The order given is not
intended to be chronological, as each case is different, and often
many of the activities are going on simultaneously.
One excellent aid in organizing trial preparation is a trial
notebook, a looseleaf notebook with separate sections for jury, voir
dire, opening statement, plaintiff's testinlony, witnesses, etc. The
lawyer may want to set up such a system on his own; or, an excellent
system called Trial By Notebook is commercially available from the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America Education Fund.
B. [9.3] SETTING THE CASE FOR TRIAL
In most cases, the plaintiff and his lawyer would both very much
like to see the case settled. But the worst thing that could happen
is merely for the case to sit. A way of avoiding this is to set the
case for trial fairly early in the process, to force both lawyer and
client to being preparing in earnest, and to realistically evaluate
the case for settlement purposes.
The timing of setting the case for trial depends on many factors,
among them the plaintiff's medical condition (and whether it is
improving or deteriorating). It also depends largely upon the backlog
in the particular court where the case is pending. As an example, one
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of the courts where the author practices has had a backlog of 18
months or more between the date the motion to set was filed and the
actual trial date. In this court, it was common practice to set cases
for trial immediately after the answer was filed, with all parties
understanding that they would have plenty of time to complete
discovery and prepare for trial in the interim. In that same court,
the docket has now been caught up so much that the jUdge requires, as
a condition of filing the motion to set, that counsel be prepared to
try the case within 60 days. Therefore, knowledge of the local court
situation is indispensable.
c. [9.4] PREPAR I NG WITNESS LISTS AND SUBPOENAl NG
WITNESSES
Fairly early in the trial preparation, the lawyer should have a
general idea of what witnesses he wishes to call, and should be
starting to think about what order of witnesses he wishes to use.
With rare exceptions, it is not a good idea to assume that even a
friendly witness will voluntarily show up for trial - - use a
subpoena, and use it early! It can be explained to the witness that
the subpoena is something he can take to his employer, to show that he
has no choice about appearing in court.
D. [9.5] DETERMINING NEED FOR EXPERT WITNESSES
Other than doctors, who are discussed below, the experts most
commonly used in auto accident cases are accident reconstructionists
and economi st s • Occasionally, in a more exotic case, other
specialists, such as engineers and human factors experts, may be
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needed as well.
If an expert such as a reconstructionist or an economist is to be
used, the decision needs to be made as early as possible. Sometimes
the first such expert interviewed will prove to be unsatisfactory or
unavailable.
E. [9.6] PREPARING PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDA AND JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
Most courts require counsel to submit some sort of pre-trial
memoranda in automobile accident cases. Information required may
include a brief factual summary, listing of special damages, and an
outline of any evidentiary questions or other questions which are
expected to appear at trial. Federal courts typically requi re a much
more comprehensive memorandum. In both cases, counsel will usually be
expected to tender jury i nst ruct ions.
Even if the court does not require submission of such a
memorandum, the plaintiff1s attorney should consider preparing one for
his own use. These memoranda are a useful tool in trial preparation,
to demonstrate what has been done and what still needs to be done.
F. [9.7] ORGANIZING PROOF OF MEDICAL EXPENSES AND LOST
WAGES
While the plaintiff may testify as to her own medical expenses,
additional testimony is necessary to establish that the expenses are
reasonable, necessary, and related to the accident. Local practice
may vary as to what is expected in this regard. It is a rare case
where every physician and medical provider (which usually includes
radiologists) testifies. One method Which courts will typically
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accept is to have a primary physician, such as a family doctor or
orthopaedist, testify as to the amount, reasonableness, and
relatedness of his own bills. He is then read a summary of all the
other medical bills in the case, including physicians, hospitals, and
prescriptions, and is asked to render a similar opinion with respect
to those.
Typically, the bills themselves are introduced into evidence, as
exhibits, so the jury may examine them. Today bills are often
computerized, and usually contain references to insurance payments and
other prohibited subjects. To avoid problems with these, once it
appears that the case is going to trial, each medical provider should
be asked to provide a IIcleanll bill, that is, a simple listing of the
services provided, along with the date and charge for each.
G. [9.8] PREPARING EXHIBITS AND DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
Experienced trial lawyers know that jurors usually remember
considerably more of what they see than what they hear. It is
therefore important to use demonstrative evidence to keep the trial
interesting, and present major concepts. Preparation of these
materials can be time consuming, so thought should be given to them
well before trial.
Some possibilities for demonstrative evidence include: charts
summarizing medical bills; charts summarizing doctor visits; key
deposition pages, blown up to poster size; large diagrams of the
accident scene; and aerial photographs of the accident scene. Aerial
photographs are available from the Transportation Cabinet for any
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location in Kentucky, and are surprisingly affordable. The lawyer
should make a personal visit to the District Office of the Cabinet to
specify exactly what is needed.
H. [9.9] SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
In 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 u.S. 317, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548
(1986), which made summary judgments easier to obtain, at least in
federal court. Perhaps encouraged by this development, defense
counsel in automobile accident cases appear to be filing summary
judgment motions with more frequency.
There is a greater variance among the practices of jUdges in the
handling of summary jUdgment motions than in almost any other area.
Some jUdges grant these motions rather readily, while others will
virtually never grant a summary judgment motion. Summary jUdgments in
auto accident cases are rather rare, because of the factual disputes
involved in most of them; but when faced by such a motion, plaintiff1s
counsel should definitely take it seriously, and endeavor to make sure
there is sufficient evidence, either by deposition or affidavit, to
defeat the motion.
In cases where the liability of the defendant(s) is clearly
established by discovery, plaintiff1s counsel should file a motion for
partial summary jUdgment as to liability only. Even where not
successful, this motion will force the defense to come forth with all
of its evidence, including anything which might have been missed
during discovery.
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I. [9.10] MEDICAL PROOF
Good results in automobile accident cases depend on good medical
proof. Th is begi ns by determi ni n9 what doctors wi 11 test i fy, and how
they will testify.
In many cases it is not necessary to call every doctor who
treated the plaintiff. Doing so will add to the expense of trying the
case, increase the possibility of contradictions from doctor to
doctor, and, in some cases, strengthen the impression that the
Plaintiff has gone from doctor to doctor seeking a favorable opinion.
Usually, however, in the typical case where the plaintiff has been
treated by specialists, at least one specialist should be called as a
witness.
Physicians cannot be subpoenaed to court to testify. See CR
45.05(2) and CR 32.01. This rule, when coupled with the fact that
having a physician wait at court to testify at an unknown time can be
extremely expensive, results in physicians often testifying by
deposition, rather than by personal appearance.
In the major case, which justifies the cost of a physician
appearing live, the personal appearance can be very effective.
Counsel are cautioned to have a firm agreement with the doctor as to
his appearance; if he does not appear, a continuance cannot be
guaranteed, particularly where there is other medical proof available.
Short of a personal appearance in court by the doctor, the format
recommended in most cases is the videotaped deposition. Jurors are
accustomed to watching television, and a videotape of one hour or
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less, if kept interesting, should hold the attention of the jurors.
In contrast, the old method of merely reading a deposition to the
jury is virtually guaranteed to put them to sleep, and should
generally be avoided. The rare exception would be a doctor whose
testimony is crucial, but is extremely camera-shy or unimpressive on
camera. Because doctors· depositions are a crucial portion of the
case, counsel should expect to spend a significant amount of time
preparing for them. Direct examination, even in a major case, should
not exceed about one-hal f hour. Al so, in the preparation for the
deposition, the doctor should be reminded to speak English (left arm,
not "left upper extremity").
In addition to the testimony of physicians, hospital records
often make up part of the proof. One particularly important part of
these records may be the nurses· notes, because the nurse may have
made notat ions as to the obvi ous pai n that the pl ai nt iff was
suffering. Arrangements should be made well before trial to obtain
and certify whatever records are to be introduced, pursuant to KRS
422.300, et seq.
J. [9.11] MOTION IN LIMINE
The motion in limine is a, device to prohibit highly prejudicial
subjects from being raised at trial. Often in these areas, if the
question is even asked, the damage is already done. Regardless of
whether or not the objection is sustained, the jury members have heard
the question, and will unable to erase the suggestion from their
minds. In aggravated cases, a mistrial may be declared; but this must
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be regarded as a loss for the Plaintiff, because resolution of the
case is delayed, and he must once again prepare for and go through
t ri a1•
Sometimes questions asked on deposition will provide a clue to
defense strategies. If, for instance, defense counsel has asked quite
a number of questions about an old alcoholism problem he may be
planning to use that information at trial, even if the Plaintiff has
not had a drink in 20 years.
Judges often will consider motions in limine even if filed
immediately before trial. However, where possible, Plaintiff1s
counsel should file them at lease several weeks in advance of trial,
to allow for unhurried consideration by the Court.
K. [9.12] REVIEWING JUROR INFORMATION SHEETS AND
PREPARING VOIR DIRE
As soon as juror information sheets are available from the clerk,
they should be reviewed by counsel. These contain a considerable
amount of useful information about the jurors, including age,
occupation, and marital status.
The author performs two separate pre-trial steps in preparing for
juror selection: preparing questions for the jurors and making a
preliminary analysis of the jurors, attaching a positive, neutral, or
negative ranking to each juror. These will, of course, be subject to
change during the actual jury selection process.
L. [9.13] PREPARING OPENING STATEMENT
As stated below, the opening statement may be the single most
52
important element of the trial. It is important to spend considerable
time on its preparation before trial.
53
x. [10.1]
A.
THE TRIAL
[10.2] IN GENERAL
As with other portions of this monograph, a detailed description
of trial practices is well beyond its scope. Some subjects, such as
mot ions du ri ng and after t ri al, are omitted ent i rely. The best that
can be hoped for is highlighting some areas of concern. New (or old,
for that matter) trial lawyers can learn much from the practical
seminars which are presented, particularly by organizations such as
KATA and ATLA.
B. [ 10.3] THE CORNERSTONES - USE OF THEME, PRIMACY,
SIMPLICITY, FORCEFULNESS, HONESTY
The five principles listed above are generally recognized as
being important in the trial of every case. The first of these is the
use of a theme - - a short, simple theory of the case which can be
carried through from the moment the trial begins to the end of closing
argument. A sample would be IIJohn Smith's promising basketball career
was cut short in an instant by the thoughtless acts of a drunk
driver. 1I
Primacy is the principle, learned from psychologists, that people
make up their minds very quickly from the first pieces of information
they hear. Tests have shown that an astoundingly large percentage of
jurors have their understanding of the case fully formed by the end of
opening statements - - before a single word of testimony has been
heard. Some even make up their minds during voir dire. It is
therefore crucial to deliver an effective opening statement, and to be
54
persuasive from the very beginning.
Another principle from the psychologists is that the message has
to be simple. This ties in with the use of the theme. If, in
preparation, the Plaintiff's attorney determines she has 9 major
poi nts she wi shes to get across to the jury, she s imply must el imi nate
some of them. Pick a few simple points, and build the entire case
around them.
Forcefulness and self-confidence are also important. If the
1awyer does not bel i eve in her own case, how can the jury be expect ed
to believe in it? There are negative aspects to every case, and these
should be mentioned by Plaintiff's counsel in advance, to take the
II sting ll out of their use by the defense. However, all major portions
of the case, including but not limited to opening statement, direct
examination of the Plaintiff, and closing argument, should both begin
and end on a high note.
Finally, honesty is of paramount importance. By trial, the
Plaintiff undoubtedly will have been cautioned many times to be
scrupulously honest, and not to exaggerate his injuries. A dishonest
or exaggerated answer to a relatively innocuous question can sometimes
taint the entire case.
C. [10.4] JURY SELECTION
Vo 1ume s 0 fin form at ion are avail ab1eon the a rt 0 f j ury
selection. Included in them are authors' viewpoints as to the
preferred age, race, sex, and occupation of jurors for particular
types of cases. While these are useful, peremptory strikes must,
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ultimately, be made on a juror-by-juror basis. A good rule to follow
is: if you, or your client, takes an instant dislike to a juror,
strike him. He probably does not like you, either.
Besides the art involved in jury selection, the lawyer must
understand the mechanics, as well. Kentucky follows a rather unusual
procedure in which all peremptory challenges are excercised at once.
CR 47.03(3). An attorney handling her first jury trial in Kentucky
would be well advised to attend another trial, to observe the process
fi rst-hand.
D. [10.5] OPENING STATEMENT
As noted above, the opening statement is perhaps the most crucial
element of the trial. Counsel must present, in a positive, logical,
and interesting fashion, why her client is entitled to be compensated.
Th i sis best done by pres ent i ng a summa ry of the ev i dence in story
form, making use of the theme, and avoiding legalistic phrases such as
IIWe expect the evidence to show••• II
E. [10.6] CASE IN CHIEF, AVOWALS
Plaintiff1s counsel must present her case in a logical fashion.
Traditionally, this involves beginning with the liability issues and
them moving on to the damage issues. It is important that the first
and the last witnesses be strong.
Kentucky law requires that the Plaintiff testify first. KRS
421.210(3). Case law construing the statute provides that the judge
may permit a different order, in his discretion; but counsel should be
extremely careful with this rule, as many judges enforce it to the
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letter.
One other evidentiary matter should be of note. Like most
states, Kentucky requires that if the court sustains an objection to
testimony, that testimony must be made to the Court out of the hearing
of the jury, to preserve the error for appeal. Some jurisdictions
call this an offer of proof or a proffer; Kentucky calls it an avowal.
CR 43.10.
F. [10.7] CROSS-EXAMINING DEFENSE WITNESSES
Cross-examining witnesses is no different in an automobile
accident case than in any other case. As is well known, the primary
rule is to avoid asking a question to which one does not know the
answer. Some experienced trial lawyers modify the rule to state 1100
not ask a quest i on to wh i ch you cannot handl e the answer. 1I
Jurors expect vigorous cross-examination of obvious advocates,
such as the physicians called by the defense. With lay witnesses,
however, such as independent eyewitnesses to the accident, a much
gentler approach must be used. These persons did not ask to become
involved in the case, and jurors normally will identify strongly with
them.
G. [10.8] PREPARATION OF INSTRUCTIONS
The instruction of juries is another area where Kentucky practice
departs radi cally from that of many other states. Kentucky uses IIbare
bones ll instructions, meaning that, in the case of an auto accident,
the jury may be given a few simple definitions, the duties which each
party had at the time of the accident, and simple instructions for
57
apportioning and awarding damages. In federal court, however, the
instructions are likely to be much more voluminous.
Another area where Kentucky differs from some other states is
that instructions are read to the jury before, not after, closing
arguments. Typically, after both sides have rested the jUdge will
call a recess, at which time the parties will discuss their proposed
versions of the instructions. Any objections to the final version
which the court prepares must be made at that time, or the error will
be waived.
H. [10.9] CLOSING ARGUMENT
Unlike the practice in many other states, in Kentucky, each party
gives only one closing argument. The Plaintiff is, of course, last.
The closing argument should be based around the theme which has
been developed during the case. It should start and end on a high
note. While following those general principles, the attorney has
considerable flexibility in delivering a closing argument suited to
her particular style.
There are two specific Kentucky rules of which the attorney must
be aware. The first is that Kentucky does permit the per diem
argument, which breaks down pain and suffering into a specific award
for a unit of time, such as a day or an hour. Southard v. Hancock,
Ky. App., 689 S.W. 2d 616 (1985).
The attorney should also be aware, however, that Kentucky does
not permit a IIgolden rule ll argument. This is one where the attorney
asks the jurors to put themselves in the place of the defendant.
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Stanley v. Ellegood, Ky., 382 S.W. 2d 572 (1964). This should be
scrupulously avoided, to prevent the chance that reversible error will
occur at the very end of an otherwise successful trial.
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XI. [11.1] Appendix - Forms
A. [11.2] Certificate of Notification of Insurer
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NO.
-----
(PLAINTIFF1S NAME), et al PLAINTIFFS
VS. CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
(DEFENDANT NAME), et al DEFENDANTS
* * * * * * * * *
Comes now the undersigned, attorney for Plaintiff, and pursuant
to KRS 411.188, certifies notification of the following:
(HERE SET OUT SEPARATEL Y THE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF EACH
INSURANCE COMPANY, INCLUDING NO-FAULT PROVIDERS AND HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS, WHICH HAS A SUBROGATION INTEREST)
Robert D. Monfort
31 East Fourth Street
Newport, Kentucky 41071
(606) 581-8811
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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B. [11 •. 2] Complaint with Demand for Jury Trial
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NO.
-----
(PLAINTIFF1S NAME)
and
(NAME OF SPOUSE)
VS.
(DEFENDANT DRIVER)
(ADDRESS)
and
COMPLAINT WITH DEMAND
FOR TRIAL BY JURY
PLAINTIFFS
(DEFENDANT UNINSURED MOTORIST CARRIER)
(ADDRESS)
SERVE: Kentucky Secretary of State
DEFENDANTS
* * * * * * * * *
Come now the Plaintiffs, (INJURED PLAINTIFF AND SPOUSE), and for
their complaint state as follows:
FIRST CLAIM
1. On June 30, 1990, Plaintiff, (NAME OF INJURED PLAINTIFF) was
a passenger in an automobile driven by (DRIVER OF CAR IN WHICH
PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER) on Middlecreek Road in Boone County,
Kentucky.
2. At the aforesaid time, Defendant, (DEFENDANT DRIVER), was
also operating an automobile on Middlecreek Road, at or near the same
place.
3. At the aforesaid time and place, Defendant, (DEFENDANT
DRIVER), operated her vehicle in such a negligent manner as to collide
61
with the automobile in which Plaintiff (NAME OF INJURED PLAINTIFF) was
riding.
4. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of
Defendant, (DEFENDANT DRIVER), as set forth above, Plaintiff, (NAME OF
INJURED PLAINTIFF), was severely injured and has suffered, is
suffering, and will continue to suffer great physical pain and mental
anguish, all to his damage.
5. As a further di rect and proximate result of the negligence
of Defendant, (DEFENDANT DRIVER), as set forth above, Plaintiff, (NAME
OF INJURED PLAINTIFF), has incurred expenses for medical care and
treatment and will in the future be required to incur additional
expenses for medical care and treatment, all to his damage.
6. As a further di rect and proximate result of the negl igence
of Defendant, (DEFENDANT DRIVER), as set forth above, Plaintiff, (NAME
OF INJURED PLAINTIFF), has lost earnings and fringe benefits, will
continue to lose earnings and fringe benefits and has suffered
permanent impairment to his earning capacity, all to his damage.
7. This action is filed pursuant to Chapter 304.39 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes. Plaintiff, (NAME OF INJURED PLAINTIFF),
states that his IImedical expense ll caused by the accident and as
defined by the aforesaid Chapter, exceeds $1,000.00; and/or that he
has exceeded one or more of the other thresholds contained therein.
The damages herein are sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court.
SECOND CLAIM
8. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all
allegations of the First Claim, above, except to the extent that said
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allegations are unnecessary for the claim stated herein.
9. Plaintiff, (SPOUSE OF INJURED PLAINTIFF), is, and has been
at all times, the (HUSBAND OR WIFE) of Plaintiff, (NAME OF INJURED
PLAINTIFF).
10. As a direct and proximate result of her (HUSBAND1S OR
WIFE1S) injury, as stated above, and further as a direct and proximate
result of the negligence of Defendant, (DEFENDANT DRIVER), as stated
above, Plaintiff, (SPOUSE OF INJURED PLAINTIFF), has been deprived of
the services of her (HUSBAND OR WIFE) and her comfort and happiness in
his society and companionship have been impaired, and it appears that
such deprivation and impai rment will continue in the future, all to
her damage in a sum sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court.
THIRD CLAIM
11. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate herein by reference all
allegations of the First Claim and Second Claim, above, except to the
extent that said allegations are unnecessary for the claim stated
herein.
12. Defendant, (UNINSURED MOTORIST CARRIER), is a non-resident
insurance company authorized to do business to do business in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky and doing business in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, and is therefore subject to service of process through the
Secretary of State.
13. At the time and place of the accident, (DRIVER OF CAR IN
WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER) carried on the vehicle he was driving
in the accident a policy of insurance with Defendant, (UNINSURED
MOTORIST CARRIER), which included an uninsured motorist provision
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which inures to the benefit of Plaintiffs.
14. At the time and place of the accident, Defendant, (DEFENDANT
DRIVER), is believed to have been uninsured, and her status as an
uninsured motorist is sufficient to invoke the provisions of the
(UNINSURED MOTORIST CARRIER) policy in favor of Plaintiffs.
Defendant, (UNINSURED MOTORIST CARRIER) is, therefore, jointly and
severally liable to Plaintiffs, to the extent of the coverage of its
uninsured motorist clause for damages negligently caused to Plaintiffs
by Defendant, (DEFENDANT DRIVER).
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgement against Defendants,
jointly and severally, in a sum sufficient to fully compensate them
for their damages, as set forth above, and as shown by the evidence;
and further demand their costs herein expended and any and all other
relief to which they may appear entitled.
PLAINTIFFS DEMAND TRIAL BY JURY.
Robert D. Monfort
31 East Fourth Street
Newport, Kentucky 41071
(606) 581-8811
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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c. [11.3] Application for Benefits - Personal Injury Protection
(Kentucky No-Fault)
...-cNITANT: .. TO INAaLI .. 10 DIlI......E • YOU AM INTIl..EO TO aENUITI UNDP tHI POUCYMOLDUrI INSURANCE
OOM1'MCT. YOU MUll COtuUTI~ .........GMt.
.. YOU MUST AUG .... 1'HI AnACHIO MllHGlllZATIOM CII.
.. ...... ....,TLY WItH Mit' "lOCAL .... YOU HAVE MCINIO TO DATE.
DATI OUR POI.ICYHO&J)IR DATE Of ACCIOlNT , ... HUM'.R
L
--, '0: ......
I CLAIM D£'ARTMENT
"'~E OF COMPANY
t. YOUR NA"E HOMa..... .....,
I. YOURADDR£IIINO.ITREET.ClTYORTOWN.fTATE',.,CODEI DATE OF .aRTH IOCIAL SECURITY NO.
a. OATi AND TIMI OF ACCIDENT
A .
P .
•• MIU OUCIUPTION Of ACQDlNT
PLACE 0# ACCIDINT ClTMiT. CITY OR TOWN AND ,TATE)
t. DO YOU OR ANY MEMIER Of YOUR HOUIlHOC..O OWN A Yea0 WEAl YOU THE GAIVER 0' THI MOTOR YEHICLE'
MOTOA VIHICa.I' 110 OWEM YOU A PASSENGER IN THI MOTOR VEHICLE'
• .-yO-....... OF ..IUMNCI COUPANY: WlAi YOU A "DEITRlAN'
" POLICY.:
YII0 WEM YOU A MIMIER OF THI MOTOR VEHICLE
=~o::.:e:.CJ~ :~~=~l==tY= '=:::'..00 OWNIR" HOUSEHOLD?
YEIO HoD
YISONO 0
YEloNO 0
YHONoD
.. Aa A R£SULTO' TN_ ACCIDENT WERE YOU INJUReD?
• 'WO-. lION HIM AND RITUAN tMII fOAM TO Ut.
.......
J. DUCRtll YOUR IN.IURY
... ·WEIIl YOU TMATEO IYA DOCTOR? YUD .NOo
YHD " YOUR ANSWER II -VES... CO..'LlTI tHE .IT OF tHII FO"...
IIOODlle----------------
DOCIO.... NAMi AND ADDRESS
.. • YOU WEl'l TREAtED IN A HOSPITAL. WERE YOU AN HOIPtTAL'S NAME AND ADORESI
.........0 OuI"-AUMIt.. AMOUNT OF MiOICAL...... ·~W~aL~L~Y~OU~HA~VE~MORI-~~~.. tlDeC~:A~~--~A~T~lH...E~TI-..~E~o~,...y...O-U.....R-A...CC.....I...O.....EN~T~...W~E...R~I-Y...O-U-.N-TH-E-
TODATl: I lUINI£' YUO NOD ~Of YOUR EMPLOYMEHn YIIO NO 0
11. DID YOU LOIE WAGE' 0 .. IALARY AS A "EaULT
0* YOUR .tUuMY' YEIO NO 0 ., -viS·. AMOUNT LOSTTO DATE: I WHAT as YOUR AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGEOR SALARY' I
I'. • YOU LOST WAGEI: IIGINNtNG DATE OP DIIAaLIYY fROM WOM ...OA-TE YOU RETURNED TO WORK _
,~. HAVE YO", RECEIVED OR ARE YOU ELlOt.LE FOR IENUI1I UHD~:
. ,. ANY WO""MEN" COW..ENSATI?N I.AW' VI' W NO U If' -VE.... AMOUNT: PE" WEEK 0
J.IOCIAL IlCU"'T' .£HUIT" YE.O NOD PER MONTH 0
,.. UST NAMES , AOORESIEI Of YOUR ' ......OYI.. , OTHIA IM....OYIRS FOR 1 YIAR ,.RIOR TO,'CCIDENT DATE. GIVE OCCU'ATtJH
& EMPLOYMlNT DIeTES •
...................._~.~.~ ........................•...............~~ ;~ ~~ .
...................._~.~.~ ~~~ ;~ ,~ .
....................~.~.~ _~ ;~ ,~ .
,I. AI A llllU&.T OF YOUIIINNRY. HAYI YOU HAD ANY O'htEII U ....I£S' Y'IO NOt] If -yE.......... eft ....,..._ •
..........----------- OATI _
........................................................................, .
DO NOT DetACH
MI1ltORIZATION,.MIDICAL INFOAMAttOtt
CON="~~u:.=..~=t~:EREOP WLL AU1ItMZI YOU TO fURNISH ALL INFQRMAt'IOH YOU MAY HAft RlGAlaCMHG MY
DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSII. YOU AN AUT~~;~~=".::u::~""TOAYO.'AIHED. X·RAY PHYSICAL FINDINGS.MOl~TIOH IIHU.T, CICINlUCIY 'NO-IAULT t LAW. IN ACCOROANCE W'TH THE HRSONAL INJURY
......................................................····DO_·.i~······· .. ···································· .
" AUTMONzATION '011 WMI AND IALAIIY IHfQIWATION
INII AUTHOAaZATtON "OR PHOTOCCWY HllIlO' waLL AUT
.GARDING MY WAGlI OR SALARY WHILE IIII"'OYIO I' ::-:~c:.TO FURNISH ALL INFOR..ATION YOU WAY HAVE
ACCOAOANCE WI1H 'HI PPIONA&. UlNAY MO'ICT~ aWMe';" £&..1 AUT~IO '0 NOvIOl THII INFOIUMTIOH IN
--... --..or , tUCtcY NO-IAUtT'LAW.
......
a .. II CN. Det.
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D. [11.4] Authori4ation-fori'led:ical--' Information
AUTHORIZATION FOR MEDICAL INFORMATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This authorizes physicians, hospitals, and all medical attendants to
furnish full and complete medical reports and information to Robert D. Monfort,
Attorney at Law, 31 East Fourth Street, Newport, Kentucky 41071, or to any
rep r e-s entat i ve, i nvest i gat 0 r 0 rot her age nt 0 f s aid Robe rto. M0 nfor t ;
and especially any and all medical reports and information concerning
This authorization also includes examination of all hospital records, X-ray
films, and the furnishing of any information including opinions, which will aid
said attorney.
Your full cooperation with the attorney is requested. You are further
requested to disclose no information to any adjuster or other persons without
written authority from me or my attorney to do so.
A photocopy of this authorization shall be as valid as the original.
ALL PRIOR AUTHORIZATION IS HEREBY CANCELLED.
Patient
DATED this day of , 19
---------
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MEDICAL AUTHORIZATION:#l-RDM
E. 111.5J Cont~n8enc~ Fee Contract
CONTINGENCY FEE CONTRACT
, hereinafter
-c-a"="""'l-=-,e-d-:--in-i C~l::-l:--·e-n~t~("-s~)-,-nii-O:-h-e-r-e~b-y-e-m-p"="'"lo-y--'-(s-)r---:R~o-:"b-e-r~t~D~.--:'-M~o-n~f~o-r-t-,~A-t t-o-rney at Law,
hereinafter called "Attorney," to represent Client(s) in recovering damages by
settlement or suit from
As compensation, Attorney is to receive an amount equal to per cent
of the gross recovery on said claim by settlement or suit. This fee covers all
duties normally performed but does not cover any appeal which might be taken. It
is further agreed that in addition to the aforesaid compensation, Client(s)
is/are to bear the cost of all out-of-pocket expenses which may be incurred
including, but not limited to, court costs, depositions, expert witnesses,
travel and long distance phone calls. Said expenses are payable by Client(s)
regardless of the outcome of the case.
Client(s) shall assist Attorney in furtherance of this case; Attorney
agrees to pursue the matter diligently.
Additional terms:
Signed in
-------------
day of , 19
--- ------------
, this
------------
Robert D. Monfort
CONTINGENCY FEE CONTRACT:#l-RDM
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Client
Client
F. [11.6] Authorization for Employment, Wage and Salary Information
AUTHORIZATION FOR EMPLOYMENT,
WAGE AND SALARY INFORMATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This authorizes any firm, corporation, company, public agency or other
employer to furnish to Robert D. Monfort, Attorney at Law, 31 East Fourth
Street, Newport, Kentucky 41071, or to any representative, investigator or other
agent of said Robert D. Monfort, any and all information or opinions which they
may request regarding my present or past employment, payroll records, and any
other information that may be kept by said firm, corporation, company, agency,
or others by virtue of my employment or association with them. My said attorney
has been retained by me to prosecute a claim for damages sustained and your full
cooperation with my attorney is requested. You are further requested to
disclose no information to any other person, without written authorization by me
to do so. All prior authorization is hereby cancelled. A photocopy of this
authorization shall have the same force and effect as the original.
DATED this __ day of - __, 19
WAGE & SALARY AUTHORIZATION:#1-RDM
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STM.UroRY APPENDIX
KEN'IUCKY RULES OF CIVIL PR<X:EDURE
Rule 8.01. Claims for relief. - (1) A pleading which sets forth a claim
for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third-
party claim, shall contain (a) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and (b) a demand for judgment
for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or
of several different types may be demanded.
(2) In any action for unliquidated damages the prayer for damages in
any pleading shall not recite any sum as alleged damages other than an
allegation that damages are in excess of any minimum dollar amount nec-
essary to establish the jurisdiction of the court; provided, however, that all
parties shall have the right to advise the trier of fact as to what amounts
are fair and reasonable as shown by the evidence. When a claim is made
against a party for unliquidated damages, that party may obtain informa-
tion as to the amount claimed by interrogatories; if this is done, the amount
claimed shall not exceed the last amount stated in answer to interrogator-
ies. (Amended October 18, 1977, effective January 1,1978; amended June
29, 1984, effective January 1, 1985; amended June 30, 1986, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1987.)
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers - Sanc-
tions. -'. Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individ-
ual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by
an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by Rule or statute,
pleadings need not be verified or -accompanied by affidavit. The rule in
equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by
the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating
circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party consti-
tutes a certification by him that he has" read the pleading, motion or other
paper; that to the best of his .knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a .good faith argument for the extension, modificatiori or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to Cause unnecessary delay or needless in-
crease in the cost of litigation. ;I(,a pleading, motion or other paper is·not
signe.d; it shall be stricken ..unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention· of the pleader or m<;lvailt. IT a pleading;' motion, _-·or
other paper is signed in violation" :of this rule; the~urt, u~n motio~""or
upon its own initiative, :shall/impose upon the person" who.·signed it, a
represented party, or ~th;'anapp~priatesanction, which may ,include an
order to pay to the other party o~parties the amount· of the "reasonable
exPenses incurred because. of the filing of the pleading, motion,' or other
paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The Cow;t shall Pe;>stpone ~l­
ing on any Rule 11 motions ~led in: the litigation until after ~ntry of a ~nal
judgment. (Amended July 8,"~983~'effectiveJanuary1, 1984; amended'July
12, 1989~ effective·~.'28, 1989.) '.
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Rule 26.02. Scope of discovery. - (1) In General. Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of
any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, con-
dition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and
the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably cal-
culated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. .
(2) Insurance Agreements. A party may obtain discovery of the existence
and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person carrying
on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment
which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for pay-
ments made to satisfy the judgment. Information concerning the insurance
agreement is not by reason ofdisclosure admissible in evidence at trial. For
purposes of this section, an application for insurance shall not be treated as
part of an insurance agreement.
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials.
(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (4) of this rule, a party may
obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable
under paragraph (1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or
for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representa-
tive (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or
agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substan-
tial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means. In ordering discovery ofsuch materials when the
required showing has been made, the court shall protect agairist discl~sure
of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
(b) A party may obtain without the required showing a statement con-
cerning the action or its subect matter previously made by that party. Upon
request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by
that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court
order. The provisions of Rule 37.01(4) apply to the award of expenses in-
curred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this subparagraph (b), a
statement previously made is (i) a written ~tement signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by the person making it, or (ii) a stenographic, me-
chanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a
substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it
and 'contemporaneously recorded.
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions
held by experts, otherwise discov~rable under the provisions of paragraph
(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for
trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(a) (i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to
identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert
witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected
to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the
expert is expected to testify and a summary ofthe grounds for each opinion.
(ii) :Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by other means,
subject to such restrictions as to .~pe and such provisions, pursuant to
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paragraph (4) (c) of this· rule, concerning fees and expenses as the court may
deem appropriate.
.'.(b) A party may discover facts ,known or opinions held by an expert who
has beeil retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of
litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be call~ as·a
witness at trial; only as provided in Rule 35.02 or upon a showing of excep-
tional cir~tancesunder which it is impracticable for the party seeking
discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other meanS.
..(c) Unless~est injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that
the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent
in.responding to discovery"under paragraphs (4)(a)(ii) and (4)(b) of this rule~
and (ii) with respect to discovery obtained under paragraph (4)(a)(ii) of this
rUle the court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under
paragraph (4)(b) of this rule the court shall require, the party seeking
discovery' to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses
reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions
frOin the expert. (Amended effective October 1,1971; amended October 18,
1977, effective January 1, 1978; amended November 21, 1977, effective
January 1, 1978.) .
Rule 32.01. Use of depositions. - At the trial or upon the hearing of
a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so
far as admissible under the rules of evidence applies as though the witness
were then present and testifying, may be used against any party who was
present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reason-
able notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contra-
dicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness.'
(b) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the
deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent, or a person desig-
nated under Rule 30.02(6) or ·.31.01(2) to testify on behalf of a public or
private cqrporation, partnership or association or governmental agency
which is a party. may be, used by an adverse party for any purpose.
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not·a party, may be·used by
·any·party for any purpose if the ·Court finds the witness: (i) is at a greater
distance than 100 miles from the place where the court sits in which·the
action is pending, or out of the state, unless it appears that the absence of
the witness wu procured by the party offering the deposition; or (ii) is the
governor, secretary, auditor or treasurer of the state; or (iii) is a judge or
'clerk ofa court; or (iv) is a postmaster; or (v) is a president, cashier, teller or
clerk ofa bank; or (vi) is a practicing physician, dentist or lawyer; or (vii) is
a keeper,' officer or guard of a penitentiary; or (viii) is dead; or (ix) is of
unsound mind, having been of sound mind when his deposition was taken;
or (x) is prevented from attending the trial by illness, infirmity, or impris-
onment; or (xi) is in the military service of the United States or of this
state; or (xii) if.the court finds that such exceptional circumstances exist as
to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance ofpresenting the testimony ofwitnesses orally in open court, to
allow the ,deposition to be used.
(d) If only part "of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an ad-
verse party may require him to introduce any other part which ought in
fairness to be considered. with the part introduced, and any party may
introduce any other parts.
(e) Depositions may be used in the trial of actions as provided in Rule
43.04.
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(0 Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use depositions
preyiously taken; and when an action in any court of this state or any
United States court sitting in this state, has been dismissed and another
action involving the same subject matter is afterward brought between the
same parties or their representatives or successors in interest, all deposi-
tions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action may be used in the
latter as if originally taken therefor. (Amended effective October I, 1971;
amended October 18, 1977, effective January 1, 1978.)
Rule 35.02. Report of examjnjng physician. - (1) If requested by ;
the party against whom an order is made under Rule 35.01 or the person'
examined, the party causing the examination to be made shall deliver to
him a copy of a detailed written report of the examining physician setting
out his findings, including results of all tests made, diagnoses and conclu-
sions, together ·with .like reports of all earlier examinations of the same
condition. After delivery the party causing the examination shall be enti-
tled upon request to receive from the party against whom the order is made
a like report ofany examination, previously or thereafter made, ofthe same
condition, unlesS, in the case of a report of examination of a person not a
party, the party shows that he is unable to obtain it. The court on motion
may make an order against a party requiring delivery of a report on such
terms 'as are just, and if a physician fails or refuses to make a report the
court may exclude his testimony if offered at the trial.
(2) This rule applies to examinations made by agreement of the parties,
unless the agreement expressly provides otherwise. This rule does not pre-
clude discovery of a report of an examining physician or the taking of a
deposition of the physician in accordance with the provisions of any other
rule. (Amended effective October 1, 1971.)
Rule 43.10. Avowals. - In an action tried by a jury, if an objection to
a question propounded to a witness is sustained by the court, upon request
of the examining attorney, the witness may make a specific otTer of his
answer to the question. The court shall require the offer to be made out of
the hearing of the jury. The court may add such other or further statement
as clearly shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. In actions tried without
a jury the same procedure may be followed, except that the court upon
request shall take and report the evidence in full, unless it clearly appears
that the evidence is not admissible on any ground or that the witness is
privileged.
Rule 45.05. Subpoena for a hearing or trial - Personal atten-
dance. - (1) At the request of any party, subpoenas for attendance at a
hearing or trial shall be issued by the clerk of the court in which the action
is pending, and such a subpoena may be served at any place within ~he
state. . .,
(2) Subject· to the provisions of paragraph (3) of this Rule, a witness
whose deposition might be used under Rule 32.01(c) shall not be compell~
to appear in court fOf oral examination, unless he failed, when duly ~ubp~
naed, to give his· deposition.
. (3) Upon the affidavit of a party or his attorney that the testimony of a
witness is important, and that the just and proper effect of his testimony
cannot in a reasonable degree be obtained without an oral examination i~
court, the court may, iIi i~ discretion, order the personal attendance oft~~
witness, although such witness may otherwise be exempt from personal
72
attendance. (Amended effective October 1, 1971; amended October IS·,
1977, effective January 1, 1978; amended November 21, 1977, effective
January 1, 1978.) ..
Rule 47.03. Peremptory challenges. - (1) In civil cases each oppos-
ing side shall have three peremptory challenges, but co-parties having
antagonistic interests shall have three peremptory challenges each.
(2) If one or two additional jurors are called, the number of peremptory
challenges for each side and antagonistic co-party shall be i~creased by
one.
(3) After the parties have been given the opportunity of challenging
jurors for cause, each side or party having the right to exercise peremptory
challenges shall be handed a list of qualified jurors drawn from the bo~
equal ·to the number of jurors to be seated plus the number of allowable
peremptory challenges for all parties. Peremptory challenges shall be exer-
cised simultaneously by striking names from the list and returning it to the
trial judge. If the number of prospective jurors remaining on the list ex~
ceeds the number ofjurors to be seated, the cards bearing numbers identify-
ing the prospective jurors shall be placed in a box and thoroughly mixed,:
following which the clerk shall draw at random the number of cards neces-
sary to comprise the jury or, if so directed by the court, a sufficient number
of cards to reduce the jury to the number required by law, in which latter'
event the prospective jurors whose identifying cards remain in the box
shall be empaneled as the jury. (Adopted September 4,1979, effective Jim4-
ary 1, 1980.) ,-
KENlUCKY REVISED STATUTES
186.590. Minor's negligence imputed to person signing applica-
tion or allowing him to drive. - (1) Any negligence of a minor under the
age of eighteen (18) who has been licensed upon an application signed as
provided by KRS 186.470, when driving any motor vehicle upon a highway,
shall be imputed to the person who signed the application of the minor for
the license. That person shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor
for any damages caused by the negligence.
(2) If a minor deposits or there is deposited in his behalf, a proof of
financial responsibility in form and amounts required by K.RS chapter 187,
the person who signed the application shall not, while such proof is main-
tained, be subject to the liability imposed by subsection (1). If the minor is
the owner of a motor vehicle, the proof of financial responsibility shall be
with respect to the operation of that motor vehicle; if not an owner, then
with respect to the operation of any motor vehicle.
(3) Every motor vehicle owner who causes or knowingly permits a minor
under the age of eighteen (18) to drive the vehicle upon a highway, and any
person who gives or furnishes a motor'vehicle to the minor shall be jointly
and severally liable with the minor for damage caused by the negligence of
the minor in driving the vehicle. (2739m-41, 2739m-53, 2739m-54.)
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188.020. Nonresident owner or operator of motor vehicle makes
secretary of state process agent. - Any nonresident operator or owner
of any motor vehicle who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of this
state to nonresidents to operate motor vehicles or have them operated
within state shall, by such acceptance and by the operation of such motor
vehicle within this state, make the secretary ofstate the agent ofhimselfor
his personal representative for the service of process in any civil action
instituted in the courts of this state against the operator or owner, or the
personal representative of the operator or owner, arising out ofor by reason
of any accident or collision or damage occurring within this state in which
the motor vehicle is involved. (12-1: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 22, § 1; 1960, ch.
119, § 1.)
188.030. Service of summons and complaint in action against non-
resident motorist. - The clerk of the court in which the action is brought
shall issue a summons against the defendant named in the complaint and
direct it to the sheriff of Franklin County. The sheriff shall execute the
summons by delivering two (2) true copies to the secretary of state and
shall also deliver with each summons an attested copy of plaintiff's com-
plaint. The secretary ofstate shall immediately mail a copy ofthe summons
and complaint to the defendant at the address given in the complaint. The
letter shall be posted by prepaid certified mail, return receipt requested,
and shall bear the return address of the secretary of state. The sheriff shall
make the usual return to the court, and in addition the secretary of state
shall make a return to the court showing that the acts contemplated by this
statute have been performed, and shall attach to his return the registry
receipt, if any. Summons shall be deemed to be served on the return of the
secretary of state and the a.ction shall proceed as provided in the Rules of
Civil Procedure. (12-2: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 64; 1972, ch. 307, § 1;
1974, ch. 315, § 25; 1980, ch. 114, § 34, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch.
185, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.)
244.080. Retail sales to certain persons prohibited - Affirmative
defense in prosecution for selling to a minor. - No·retaillicensee shall
sell, give· away or deliver any alcoholic beverages, or procure or permit any
alcoholic beverages to be sold, given away or delivered to:
(1) A minor, except that in any prosecution for selling alcoholic beverages
to a minor it is an affirmative defense that the sale was induced by the use
offalse, fr~udulent,or altered identification papers or other documents and
that the appearance and character of the purchaser were such that his age
could not have been ascertained by any other means and that the
purchaser's appearance and character indicated strongly that he was oflegal
age to purchase alcoholic beverages. Such evidence may be introduced either
in mitigation of the charge or as a defense to the charge itself.
(2) A pers~n actually or apparently under the influence of alcoholic
beverages.
(3) An habitual drunkard or any person convicted of drunkenness as
many as three (3) times within the most recent twelve (12) months period.
(4) Anyone known to the seller to have been convicted of any
misdemeanor attributable directly or indirectly to the use of alcoholic
beverages, or of a felony. (25Mb-181: amend. Acts 1972, ch. 286, § 1.)
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271B.5-040. Service on corporation. - (1) A corporation's ~egistered
agent shall be the corporation's agent for service of process, notice,.or de-
mand required or permitted by law to be served on the corporation..
(2) If a corporation has no registered agent, or the agent cann~t WIth
reasonable diligence be served, the corporation may be served by registered
or certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the secretary of t~e
corporation at its principal office. Service shall be perfected under thIS
subsection at the earliest of: .
(a) The date the corporation receives the mail;
(b) The date shown on the return receipt, if signed on behalf of the corpo-
ration; or
(c) Five (5) days after its deposit in the United States mail, as evidenced
by the postmark, if mailed postpaid and correctly addressed. .
(3) This section does not prescribe the only means, or necessanly the
required means, of serving a corporation. (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 23, § 32,
effective January 1, 1989~)
304.3·230. Service of process on insurers - Secretary of State as
attorney for service of process. - (1) Upon issuance of a certificate of
auth~rityto do business in this state, the ~ollowingsltall1?e d~m~,~.~y~
appomted the Secretary of State as theIr attorney to receIve setvlce of
laWfu.l process issued against them in this ,s~te: '. :~ ~ ;
(a) Foreign: or alien insurers; , .
(b) Domestic reciprocal insurers;
(c) Domestic Lloyd's insurers;
(d) Qualified self-insurers. I • I.
(2) Such appointment shall be irrevocable, shall bind any successor in
interest or to the .assets or liabilities of the insurer, and shall remain in
effect as long as there is in force in this state or elsewhere a contract that
would give rise to a cause of action in this state, made by the insurer; or
liabilities or duties arising therefrom.
. (3) Service of lawful process against unauthorized insurers, "except -in
contracts issued by insurers or underwriters to industrial insureds as de-
fined in KRS304.11-020, shall be made upon the Secretary of S~te, as
provided in KRS 304.11-040. . '. . ' - .
(4) Service of lawful process against authorized domestic insurers shall
be had pursuant to KRS 271B.5-040.
,.(5) If, ~he Secr~tary of State is by law the lawful ~ttomey for ~e~ice of
process, the clerk of the court in which action' is brought shall issue a
summons against the defendant name,d in the complaint and shall serye by
certified mail, return 'receipt requested, two (2) true copies of the 'summons
with two (2) attested copies ofplaintiffs complaint to the Secretary ofState.
The Secretary of State shall immediately mail a copy of the summons and
complaint to the defendant; if an authorized insurer, to the person desig-
nated pursuant to subsection (7) of KRS 304.3-150, and if an unauthorized
insu~er to the last. known principal place of business. The letter shall be
posted ~by prepaid certified mail, return receipt' requested, and shall bear
the return address of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State shall
make a return to the court showing that the .acts contemplated by 'this
statute have been performed, and shall attach to his return the regi'stry
receipt, if any. Summons shall be deemed to be served on the return of the
Secretary ofState and the action shall proceed as provided in the Kentucky
Rules of ~Civil Proced·ure. ' " .' , , :. .
(6) The Secretary of State shall keep a record of the date and hour of
receipt of such lawful process, as well as the date it is forwarded to the
defendant. .
(7) For the purpose of this section, ttlawful process" shall include only the
summons which initiates and commences a cause of action, and such other
initial notices, rules, or orders which would be required by the Kentucky
Rules .of Civil· ProcedUre to be byperaonal service. '.
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(8) The sheriff serving the summons upon the Secretary of State shall
pay to him at the time of service a fee in the amount set forth in KRS
454.210, which shall be taxed as costs in the actio~. (Repealed and reenact.
Acts 1990, ch. 425, § 2, effective July 13, 1990.).·' ; .
304.12-230. Unfair claims eeU1ement practices. - It is an unfair
claims settlement practice for any person to commit or perform. any of the
following acts or omissions: .
(1) Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relat-
ing to coverages at· issue; . . .
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communi-
cationS with respect to clainis arising under insurance policies; .
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt
investigation of claims arising under insurance policies;
(4) Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation
based upon all available infonnation; .
(5) Failing to affmn or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time
after ·proof of loss statements haye been completed;
(6) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;
(7) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due
under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts
ultimately recovered in actions brought by such insureds;
(8) Attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a
reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to writ-
ten or printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an appli-
cation;
(9) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was
altered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of the insured;
(10) Making claims payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompa-
nied by statement setting forth the coverage under which the payments 8!e
being made;
(11) Making known to insureds or claimants a policy of appealing from .
arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of
compelling them to accept settlements or compromises less than the
amount awarded in arbitration;
. (12) Dela¥ing the investiga:ti.on or ~ayment of cl~ms by requiring an
Insured, claImant, or the phYSICIan of eIther to submIt a preliminary claim
report and then rt:Quiring t~e.subseque~t 8ubmissi~n of formal proof of loss
forms, both of which 8ubDllSSIOns contain substantially the same informa-
tion; .
(13) Failing to promptly settle claims, where liability has beCome rea-
sonably clear, under one P9rtion f;)f the insurance policy coverage in order to
influence settlements under other portions of tlie· insurance polley cover-
age; or· .. . ' .
(14) Failing to promptly provide a reasonable e:g»lanation of the basis in
the insurance j)Olicy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial ofa
claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement. (Enact.·'Acts 1984, ch.
171, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 225, § 19, effective July "15,
1988.) . . ' . . . "
304.39-060. Acceptance or rejection of partial abolition of tort lia-
bility - Exceptions. - (1) Any person who registers, operates, maintains
or uses a motor vehicle on the public roadways of this Commonwealth shall,
as a condition of such registration, operation, maintenance or use of such
motor vehicle and use of the public roadways, be deemed to have accepted
the provisions of this subtitle, and in particular those provisions which are
contained in this section.
76'
(2) (a) Tort liability with respect to accidents occurring in this Common-
wealth and arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor
vehicle is tCabolished" for damages because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease to the extent the basic reparation benefits provided in this subtitle
are payable therefor, or that would be payable but for any deductible autho-
rized by this subtitle, under any insurance policy or other method of secu-
rity complying with the requirements of this subtitle, except to the extent
noneconomic detriment qualifies under paragraph (b) of this subsection.
(b) In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator
or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been
provided as required in this subtitle, or against any person or organization
legally responsible for his acts or omissions, a plaintiff may recover dam-
ages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience because
of bodily injury, sickness or disease arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance, operation or use of such motor vehicle only in the event that the
benefits which are payable for such injury as tntedical expense" or which
would be payable but for any exclusion or deductible authorized by this
subtitle exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), or the injury or disease con-
sists in whole or in part of permanent disfigurement, a fracture to a bone, a
compound, comminuted, displaced or compressed fracture, loss of a body
member, permanent injury within reasonable medical probability, perma-
nent loss of bodily function or death. Any person who is entitled to receive
free medical and surgical benefits shall be deemed in compliance with the
requirements of this subsection upon a showing that the medical treatment
received has an equivalent value of at least one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(c) Tort liability is not so limited for injury to a person who is not an
owner, operator, maintainer or user of a motor vehicle within subsection (1)
of this section, nor for injury to the passenger of a motorcycle arising out of
the maintenance or use of such motorcycle.
(3) For purposes of this section and the provisions on reparation obligor's
rights of reimbursement, subrogation, and indemnity, a person does not
intentionally cause harm merely because his act or failure to act is inten-
tional or done with his realization that it creates a grave risk of harm.
(4) Any person may refuse to consent to the limitations of his tort rights
and liabilities as contained in this section. Such rejection must be in writ-
ing in a form to be prescribed by the department of insurance and must
have been executed and filed with the department at a time prior to any
motor vehicle accident for which such rejection is to apply. Such rejection
form together with a reasonable explanation thereof shall be furnished by
the reparation obligor with each policy to each prospective insurance appli-
cant. Such rejection form shall affirmatively state in bold print that accep-
tance of this form of insurance denies the applicant the right to sue a
negligent motorist unless certain requirements contained in the policy of
insurance are met. Rejection by a person who is under legal disability shall
be made on behalf of· such person by his legal guardian, conservator or his
natural parent. The failure ofsuch guardian or a natural pare~tofa person
under legal disability to file a rejection, within six (6)'months from the date
that this subtitle would otherwise become applicable to such person, shall
be deemed to be an aftlrmative acceptance of all provisions of this subtitle.
Provided, however, any person who, at the time of an accident, does not
have basic reparation insurance but has not formally rejected such limita-
tions of his tort rights and liabilities and has at such time in effect security
equivalent to that required by KRS 304.39-110 shall be deemed to have
fully rejected such limitations within me-niDg of this section for that acci-
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dent only.
(5) (a) Any rejection must be filed with the department of insurance and
shall become effective on the date of its filing until revoked;
(b) Any rejection filed prior to June 30, 1980, shall be deemed to be
effective from the date of its filing until revoked; and
(c) Any revocation shall be in writing and shall become effective upon
the date of its filing with the department of insurance.
(6) Every insurance company when issuing an automo~ile policy to a
resident of this Commonwealth must inform the buyer in writing in a form
to be prescribed by the insurance commissioner of his right to reject the
limitations of his tort rights and liabilities under this subtitle in the man-
ner provided in subsections (4) and (7) of this section.
(7) Any rejection shall result in the full retention by the individual of his
tort rights and his tort liabilities. Any person injured by a motor vehicle
operator who has such rejection on file may claim his full damages, includ-
ing nonpecuniary damages, or, if such injured person has not rejected his
own tort limitations, he may also claim basic reparation benefits from the
appropriate security on the vehicle as established under KRS 304.39-050. If
such provider of security is other than the one providing security for the
operator who has rejected the limitations, such provider shall be subro-
gated to the rights of the injured person to the extent of reparation benefits
paid against the owner and operator of the vehicle.
(8) No person who has rejected the tort limitations under this section,
except as provided in subsection (9) of this section or KRS 304.39-140(5),
may collect basic reparation benefits.
(9) Any owner or operator of a motorcycle, as defined in Kentucky Re-
vised Statutes, may file a rejection as described in subsections (4) and (5) of
this section, which will apply solely to the ownership and operation of a
motorcycle but will not apply to injury resulting from the ownership, opera-
tion or use of any other type of motor vehicle. (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 385,
§ 6; 1976, ch. 75, § 2, effective March 29, 1976; 1980, ch. 364, § 1, effective
July 15, 1980; 1986, <:h. 37, § 1, effective July 15, 1986.) .
304.39-100. Included coverages. - (1) An insurance contract which
purports to provide coverage for basic reparation benefits or is sold with
representation that it provides security covering a motor vehicle has the
legal effect of including all coverages required by this subtitle.
(2) An insurer authorized to transact or transacting business in this
Commonwealth shall file with the commissioner of insurance as a condition
of its continued transaction of business within this Commonwealth a form
approved by the commissioner of insurance declaring that in any contract
of liability insurance for injury, wherever issued, covering the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle other than motorcycles while the
vehicle is in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to provide the basic
reparation benefits coverage and minimum security for tort liabilities re-
quired by this subtitle, except a contract which provides coverage only for
liability in excess of required minimum tort liability coverage. !my nonad-
mitted insurer may file such form. (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 385, § 10; 1976,
ch. 75, §. 3, effective March 29, 1976.)
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304.39·110. Required mjnimum tort liability insurance. -' (l)The
requirement of secUrity for payment of tort liabilities is fulfilled by provid-
ing: .' . - ,- .
(a) -Either:
. (1) Split' limits liability coverage of not less than twenty-:five ~oUsand
dollars ($25,000) for 'an damages arising out of bodily injury sustained by
anyone (1) person, and not less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for all
damages arising, out.of bodily injury sustained by all.persons injured as a
result of anyone (1) accident, plus liability coverage of not less than ten
thousand dollars ($10,000) for all damages arising out of damage to or
destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, as a result of any
one (1) accident arising out of ownership, maintenance, use, loading, or
unloading, of the secured vehicle; or
(2) Single limits liability coverage ofnot less than sixty thousand dollars
($60,000) for all damages whether arising out of bodily injury or damage to
property as a result of anyone (1) accident arising out of ownership, main-
tenance, use, loading, or unloading, of the secured vehicle;
(b) That .the liability.coverages apply to accidents during the contract
period in a territorial area not less than the United States of America, its
territories and possessions, and Canada; and .
(c) Basic reparation benefits as defined in KRS 304.39-020(2).
(2) Subject to the provisions on approval of terms and forms, the require-
ment ofsecurity for payment of tort liabilities may be met by a contract the
coverage of which is secondary or excess to other applicable ·valid and col-
lectible liability insurance. To the extent the secondary or excess coverage
applies to liability within the minimum security required by this subtitle it
must be subject to conditions consistent with the system of required liabil-
ity insurance established by this subtitle.
(3) Security for a motorcycle is fulfilled by providiJ!g only the coverages
set forth in subsections (l)(a), and (b) of this section. (Enact. Acts 1974,' ch.
385, § 11; 1976, ch. 75, § 4, effective March 29, 1976; 1984, ch. 19, § 2,
effective July 13, 1984; 1984, m. 86, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch.
437, § 31, effective July 15, 1986.)· .
304.39-140. Optional additional benefits. - (1) On and after July 1,
1975, each reparation obligor of the owner ofa vehicle required to be regis-
tered in this Commonwealth shall, upon the request of a reparation in-
sured, be required to provide added reparation benefits for economic loss in
units of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per person subject to the lesser of:
(a) Forty thousand dollars ($40,000) in added reparation benefits; or
(b) The limit of security provided for liability to anyone (1) person in
excess of the requirements of KRS 304.39-110(1) (a).
(2) Each basic reparation obligor shall be permitted to incorporate in
added reparation benefits coverage such terms, conditions and exclusions
as may be consistent with premi~charged. The amounts payable under
added reparation benefits may be duplicative of benefits received from col-
lateral source' benefits, or may provide for reasonable waiting periods, de-
ductibles or coinsurance provision. The added reparation 'obligor shall be
subrogated, subject to KRS 304.39-070 and 304.39-300, to the injw-ed per-
son's right of recovery against any responsible third party.
(3) If the il\iured person, or il\iured persons, is entitled to damages under
KRS 304.39-060 from the liability insurer ofa' second person, a self-insurer
or an obligated government, collection of such damages shall have priority
over the rights of the subrogee for its reimbursement of basic or added
reparation benefits paid to or in behalf of such injured person or persons.
(4) Basic reparation insurers shall make available upon request deduct-
ibles in the amounts of two hundred fifty dollars ($250), five hundred dol-
lars ($500) and one thousand dollars ($1,000) from all basic reparation
benefits otherwise payable, except that if two (2) or more basic reparation
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insureds to whom the deductible is app~icable under the contract of insur-
ance are injured in the same accident, the aggregate amount of the deduct-
ible applicable to all of them shall not exceed the specified deductible,
which amount where necessary shall be allocated equally among them.
Any person who is a basic reparation insured under an insurance policy
issued with no deductible or with a deductible of a lesser amount than that
under which he receives basic reparation benefits payments, shall be enti-
tled to be paid under such policy the difference between the benefits he is
actually paid and the benefits which would have been paid had his benefits
been payable under such policy.
(5) Reparation obligors shall make available upon request to those per-
sons who have rejected their tort limitations, in accordance with KRS
304.39-060(4), basic reparation benefits coverage and added reparation
benefits. (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 385, § 14, effective July 1, 1975; 1978, ch.
215, § 3, effective June 17, 1978.)
304.39-210. Obligor's duty to respond to claims. - (1) Basic and
added reparation benefits are payable monthly as loss accrues. Loss accrues
not when injury occurs, but as work loss, replacement services loss. or
medical expense is incurred. Benefits are overdue if not paid within thirty
(30) days after the reparation obligor receives reasonable proof of the fact
and amount of loss realized, unless the reparation obligor elects to accumu-
late claims for periods not exceeding thirty-one (31) days after the repara-
tion obligor receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of loss real-
ized, and pays them within fifteen (15) days after the period of accumula-
tion. If reasonable proof is supplied as to only part of a claim, and the part
totals one hundred dollars ($100) or more, the part is overdue if not paid
within the time provided by this section. Medical expense benefits may be
paid by the reparation obligor directly to persons supplying products, ser-
vices, or accommodations to the claimant.
(2) Overdue payments bear interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum, except that ifdelay was without reasonable foundation the rate
of interest shall be eighteen percent (18%) per annum.
(3) A claim for basic or added reparation benefits shall be paid without
deduction for the benefits which are to be substracted pursuant to the
provisions on calculation of net loss if these benefits have not been paid to
the claimant before the reparation benefits are overdue or the claim is paid.
The reparation obligor is entitled to reimbursement from the person obli-
gated to make the payments or from the claimant who actually receives the
payments.
. (4) A reparation obligor may bring an action to recover benefits which
are not payable, but are in fact paid, because ofan intentional misrepresen-
tation of a material fact, upon which the reparation obligor relies, by the
insured or by a person providing an item of medical expense. The action
may be brought only against the person providing the item of medical
expense, unless the insured has intentionally misrepresented the facts or
knows of the misrepresentation. An insurer may offset amounts he is enti-
tled to recover from the insured under this subsection against any basic or
added reparation benefits otherwise due.
(5) A reparation obligor who rejects a claim for basic reparation benefits
shall give to the clainlant prompt written notice of the rejection, specifying
the reason. If a claim is rejected for a reason other than that the person is
not entitled to the basic reparation benefits claimed, the written notice
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shall inform the claimant that he may file his claim with the assigned
claims bureau and shall give the name and address of the bureau. (Enact.
Acts 1974, ch. 385, § 21, effective July 1, 1975.)
304.39.230. Limitations of actions. - (1) IT no basic or added repara-
tion benefits have been paid for loss arising otherwise than from death, an
action therefor may be commenced not later than two (2) years after the
injured person sutTers the loss and either knows, or in the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence should know, that the loss was caused by the accident, or
not later than four (4) years after the accident, whichever iseariier. Ifbasic
or added reparation benefits have been paid for loss arising otherwise than
from death, an action for further benefits, other than survivor's benefits, by
either the same or another claimant, may be conlmenced not later than two
(2) years after the last payment of benefits.
(2) If no basic or added reparation benefits have been paid to the dece-
dent or his survivors, an action for survivor's benefits may be commenced
not later than one (1) year after the death or four (4) years after the acci-
dent from which death results, whichever is earlier. If survivor's benefits
have been paid to any survivor, an action for further survivor's benefits by
either the same or another claimant may be commenced not later than two
(2) years after the last payment of benefits. If basic or added reparation
benefits have been paid for loss BUffered by an injured person before his
death resulting from the injury, an action for survivor's benefits may be
co~eneedDot later than one (1) year after the death or four (4) years after
the last payment of benefits, whichever is earlier.
(3) If timely action for basic reparation benefits is commenced against a
reparation obligor and benefits are denied because of a determination that
the reparation obligor's coverage is not applicable to the claimant under
the provisions on priority of applicability of basic reparation security, an
action against the applicable reparation obligor or the assigned claims
bureau may be commenced not later than sixty (60) days after the determi-
nation becomes'final or the last date on which the action could otherwise
have been commenced, whichever is later.
(4) Except as subsections (1), (2), or (3) of this section prescribe a longer
period, an action by a claimant on an assigned claim which has been timely
presented may be commenced not later than sixty (60) days after the claim-
ant received written notice of rejection of the claim by the reparation obli-
gor to which it was assigned.
(5) If a person entitled to basic or added reparation benefits is under
legal disability when the right to bring an action for the benefits first
accrues, the period of his disability· is a part of the time limited for com-
meneement of the action.
(6) An action for tort liability not abolished by KRS 304.39-060 may be
commenced not later than two (2) years after the injuryt or the death, or the
last basic or added reparation payment made by any reparation obligor,
whichever later occurs. <Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 385, § 23, effective July 1,
1975.)
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411.110. Action apinst city for injury from defect in thoroughfare
-Service of notiee.-No action shall be maintained against any city in
this state because of any injury growing out of any defect in the con-
dition of any bridge, street, sidewalk, alley or other public thoroughfare,
unless notice has been given to the mayor, city clerk or clerk of the
board of aldermen in the manner provided for the service of notice in
actions in the Rules of Civil Procedure. This notice shall be filed within
ninety (90) days of the occurrence for which damage is claimed, stat-
ing the time of and place whe~ ~he injury was received an~ .the cha:-
acter and circumstances of the InJury, and that the person InJured WIll
claim damages therefor from the city. (2741e-24: amend. Acts 1954,
eh. 171.)
411.130. Action' for~wrOD.£fUIdeath - Personal.representative to
prosecute - Distribution of amount recovered. - (1) Whenever the
death of a'· person' re$Ults from an injury inflicted by the negligence or
~ngful act o.f"an~ther,dam~ges.~aybe recovered for the death from the
person who caused it,~orwhoseagent or servant caused it.·1f the act was
wilful or the negligence gross, punitive damages may be recovered. The
action shall be .prosecu~dby the personal representative of the deceased.
(2) The amount recOvered, less funeral expenses and the cost of adminis':
tration and costs ofrecovery including the attorney fees, not included in the
recovery from the defen~t~ shall be for the benefit of and go to the kin-
dred of the deceaSed in the following order:': ;"" . . '. .
(a) If the deceased leaves a widow or husband, and no children or their
descendants, then the whole to the widow or husband. .
. (b).1f the deceased leaves 'a widow and children or a husband and chil-
dren, then one-half (1/2). to the widow or husband and the other one-half (1/2)
to the children of the deceased.' . .. .
(c) H the. deceased leaves a 'child or children, but no widow 'or husband,
then the whole to .the 'child or children.' ."' ' ..
: (d) If the deceased leaves no widow, husband or child, then the'reCovery
shall pass to the mother and father of the deceased, one (1) moiety each~ if
both are living; if the mother is dead and the' father is .living, the whole
thereof shall pass to the father; and if the father is dead and the moth~r
living, the whole thereof shall go to the mother. In the event the deceased
was an adopted person, ~mother" and "father" shall mean th~ adoptive
parents of the deceased. ". . .' . .
.(e) If the deceased leaves no"widow, husband or child, and if both father
and mother are dead, then the whole of the recovery shall become a part of
the personal estate of the deceased, and after the payment of his debts the
remainder, if any, shall pass to his kindred more remote than those above
named, according to the law of descent and distribution. (6: amend. Acts
1974, ch. 89, § 1.)
411.135. Damages in action for wrongful death of minor.-In a
wrongful death action in which the decedent was a minor child, the sur-
viving parent, or parents, may recover for loss of affection and com-
panionship that would have been derived from such child during its
minority, in addition to all other elements of the damage usually re-
coverable in a wrongful death action. (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 30, § 2.)
411.145. Damages for loss of eolUlOlilam.-(l) As used in this sec-
t!0n "consortium" means the right to the services, assistance, aid, so-
. clety, companionship and conjugal relationship between husband and
wife, or wife and husband.
(2) Either a wife or husband may recover damages against a third
person for loss of consortium, resulting from a negligent or wrongful
act of such third person. (Enact. Acts 1970, eh. 200, § 1.)
82
411.182. Allocation offault in tort actions - Award ofdamages -
Effect of release. - (1) In all tort actions, inclu~ products lliibility
actions, invol\j.Dg fault of more than one~ to the action, including
third-party deCenClants and persons who have been released under subsec-
tion (4) of this section, the court, unless otherwise agreed by all ~es,
shall instruct thej~ to answer interrogatories or, if tbere is no jury, shall
make findings indica~ . .~:. .
(a) The amount ofdamages each claimant would be entitled to recover if
contributory fault is.~~ and· '.' ·
(b)" The pen:eD~eof the total fault of all the ~es to each claim that
is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, and person
who has been released .from liability under subsection (4) of this section.
(2) In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall'con-
sider both the nature of the conduct ofeach~ at fault and the extent of
the causal. relation ·between the conduct and the damages claimed. . '.'
(3) The court shall determine the .award of damages to each claimant in
accordance with the findings, subject to any reduction under subsection (4)
of this section, and shall determine and state in the judgment each party's
equita~le share of the obligation to each claimant in accordance Wlth- the
~ve percentages 'of fault. . .'
(4) A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a
claimant and a person liable, shall discharge that person from all liability
for contribution, but it shall Dot be considered to discharge any other per-
IODS liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. HoweverJ the claim of
the releasing person against other ~rsons shall be reduced by the amount
of the releaSed ~rsons' equitable8hare of the obligation, determined in
accordance with the provisions of this eectiOD. (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 224,
§ 1, effective July 15, 1988.)
, .
411.184. Definitions - P1mitive damages - Proof of punitive
damages. - (1) As used in this section and KRS 411.186, unless the con~
text requires otherwise:
(a) ttOppression" means conduct which is specifically intended by the
defendant to subject the plaintiff, to cruel and unjust hardship. .
. (b) ttFraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or conceal-
ment of material fact known to the defendant and made with the intention
of causing injury to the plaintiff.
(c) ~alice" means either conduct which is specifically intended by the
defendant to cause tangible or intangible injury to the plaintiff or conduct
that is carried out by the defendant both with a flagrant indifference to the
rights of the plaintiff and with a subjective awareness that such conduct
will result in human death or bodily harm. .
(d) ftPlaintitr' means any party claiming punitive damages.
(e) "Defendant" means any party against whom punitive damages are
sought.(0 t(Punitive damages" includes exemplary damages and means. dam-
ages, other than compensatory and nominal damages, a~a~ed agaInst. a
person to punish and to discourage him and others from SimIlar conduct In
the future. nl· b(2) A plaintiff shall recover punitive damages 0 y upon proVIng, y
clear and convincing evidence, that th~ de~endant fro~ whom such ~.
ages are sought actea toward the plaintiffWIth OppressIO~,fraud C?r J!l&hce.
(3) In DO case shall punitive damages be assesSed ag81nst.8 ~nnclpal or
employer for the act of an agent or employe unlel!S .such j)nnClpal or eJ:!l-
ployer .authorized or ratified or should have antiCIpated the conduct In
~on. . . ch'f
.. (4) In no case ahal1 punitive damageS be!l~ for~~ 0 contract.(6) This statute is applicable to aIrcasesm which ~tive dame,es are
.aught andsu~ any ~d all~.statu~or judicial law msow
as such law is ineoD8iatent with the proVISIOns of t1iis statute. (Enact. Acts
1988, ch. 224, I 2, .dve July 15, 1988.)' '. . .' .
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411.188. Notification of parties holding subrogation rights - Col-
lateral source payments and subrogation rights admissible. -
(1) This section shall apply to all actions for damages, whether in con-
tract or tort, commenced after July 15, 1988.
(2) At' the commencement of an action seeking to recover damages, it
shall be the duty of the plaintiff or his attorney to notify, by certified mail,
those parties believed by him to hold subrogation rights to any award
received by the plaintiff as a result of the action. The notification shall
state that a failure to assert subrogration rights by intervention, pursuant
to Kentucky Civil Rule 24, will result in a loss of those rights with respect
to any final award "received by ,-the plaintiff as a result of the action.
(3) Collateral source payments, except life insurance, the value of any
premiUms paid by or on behalf of the plaintiff for same, and known subro-
gation rights shall be an admissible fact in any civil trial. .
(4) A certified list of~eparties notified pursuant to subsection (2) of this
section shall also be filed with the clerk of the court at the commencement
of the action. (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 224, § 4, effective July 15, 1988.)
411.200. Immunity from civil liability of officer, director or
trustee of nonprofit organization. - Any person who serves as a direc-
tor, officer, V"olunteer or trustee of a nonprofit organization ~alified as a
tax-exempt organization under Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code
of1986, as from time to time amended, and who is not compensated for such
services on a salary or prorated equivalent basis, shall be immune from
c!vil liability for any act or omission resulting in damage or injury occur-
nng on or after July.15, 1988, if such person was acting in good faith and
within the scope of his official functions and duties, unless such damage or
injury was caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such person.
(Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 2, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.)
421.210. Competency of certain testimony. - (1) ID :all. actions be-
tween husband and wife, or between either or both of them and another,
either or both of them may testify as other witnesses, except 'as-to confiden-
tial.communications between them during maniage, provided, however,
that in an action for absolute divorce or divorce from beQ and board, either
or both of them may testify concerning any matter involved in the action,
including questions of property, and provided further, that ~eithermay be
compelled to testify for or against the other. " ",
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (6) of this section, no person
shall testify for himselfconcerning any verbal statement of, or any transac-
tion with, or any act done or omitted to be done by an infant under fourteen
(14) years of age, or by one who has been adjudged mentally disabled or
dead when the testimony is offered to be given except for the p~se, and
to the extent, of affecting one who is living, and who, when over fourteen
(14) years of age and of sound mind, heard such statement,' or was present
when such transaction· took place, or when such act was done or omitted,
and except in actions for personal injury, death or damage to property by
negligence or tortious acts, unless: .
(a) The infant or his guardian shall have testified against such person,
with reference to such statement, transaction or act; or
.(b) The person who has been adjudged mentally disabled 'shall, when of
sound mind, have testified against such person, with reference thereto; or
(c) The decedent, or a representative of, or someone interested in, his
estate, shall have testified against such person, with reference thereto; or
(d) An agent of the decedent or mentally disabled person, with reference
to such act or transaction, shall have testified against such person, with
reference thereto, or be living when such person offers to testify, with
reference thereto.(3) No person shall testify for himself, in chief, -in an ordinary action,
after introducing other testimony for himself, in chief; nor in an equitable
action, after taking other testimony for himself, in chief.
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(4) No attorney shall testify concerning a communication made to him,
in his professional character, by his client, or his advice thereon, without
the client's consent; nor shall an ordained minister, priest, rabbi or accred-
ited practitioner of an established church or religious organization be re-
quired. to testify in any civil or criminal case or proceedings preliminary
thereto, or in any administrative proceeding, concerning any Information
confidentially communicated to him in his professional capacity under such
circumstances that to disclose the information would violate a sacred or
moral trust, unless the .person making the confidential communication
waives such privilege herein provided. .'.
(5) If the right of a person to testify for himself be founded 'upon the fact
that one who is dead or mentally. disabled has testified against him, the
testimony of such person shall be confined to the facts or transactions to
which the adverse testimony related. :
(6) A person 'may testify for himself as to the correctness of original
entries made by him against persons who are under no disability - other
than infancy - in an accountmg, 'according to the usual course of business
though the·person against whom they were made may·have died or have
become mentally disabled; ·but no person shall testify for -himself concern-
ing entries in a book, or the contents or purport of any writing, .under the
control of himself, or of himSelf and others jointly, if he refuse or fail to
produce such book or writing~ and to make it subject to the order of the
court for th~purposes ofthe action, if required to do so by the party against
whom he offers to testify.. . _
(7) The assignment of a claim by a person who is incompetent to testify
for himself shall not make him competent to testify for another.
(8) A party may be examined as if under cross-examination at the in-
stance of the adverse party, either orally or by deposition as any other
witness; but .the party called for such examination shall not be concluded
thereby, but may rebut it by counter testimony.
(9) None of-the preceding proYisions of this section apply to affidavits for
provisional remedies, or to affidavits of claimants against the estates of
deceased or insolvent persons, or affect the .competency of attesting wit-
nesses of instruments which are required by law to be attested. (C.C. 606;
amend. Acts 1898, ch. 1, §§ 1 to 9; 1912, ch. 104; 1926, ch. 29; 1930, ch. 21;
1932, ch. 59; 1940, ch. 95; trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1; 1976, ch. 358, § 1;
1980, ch. 188, § 289, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 312, § 2, effective
July 15, 1980.)
422.300. Use o(photostatic copies of medical records~ Or.gpnals
held available. - Medical chartS or records ofany hospital licensed under
KRS 21GB.105 ..that are susceptible to photostatic reproduction may be·
proved as to foundation, identity and authenticity without any preliminary
testimony,' by use of legible and durable copies, certified in the manner
provided herein by the employe of the hospital charged with the responsi-
bility ofbeing custodian of the originals thereof. Said copies may be used in
any trial, hearing, deposition or any other judicial or administrative action
or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, in lieu of the original charts or
records which, however, the hospital shall hold available during the pen-
dency of the. action or proceeding for inspection and comparison by the
court, tribunal or hearing officer and by' the parties and their attorneys of
record. (Enact. Acts .1978, ch. 109, § 'I, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch.
188, § 291, effective July 15,1980.) ..' . ~ . . : '. .,
454.040. Trespass, joint or severaldamages for. - In actions oftres-
pass the jury may assess joint or several damages against the defendants.
When the jury finds several damages, the judgment shall be in favor of the
plaintiff against each defendant for the several damages, without regard to
the amount of damages claimed in the petition, and shall include a joint
judgment for the costs. (12.)
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KEN'IUCKY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.5. Fees.
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. Some factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the folloWing:
(1) The time and labor,required, the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions invovled, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service prop-
erly;
(2) The likelihood, that the acceptance of the particular employment
will,preClude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal ser-
vices;
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) The time limitationS iniposed by the client or by the circUnistances;
(6) The nature imd length of the professional relationship with the
client; .
(7) ,The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8), Whether the fee is fIXed or contingent.
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis
or rate oCthe.fee should be communicated to the client, preferably in writ-
ing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representa-
tion.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the
service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohib-
ited by paragraph (d) or other law. Such a fee must meet the requirements
of Rule 1.5(a). A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and should
state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the per-
centage or .percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of
settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted
from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or
after the contingent fee is calculated. Upon recovery of any amount iIi a
contingerit fee matter, t~e lawyer shall provide the client with a written
statement stating the outcome of the matter and showing the remittance to
the client and the method of its determination.
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(1) Any fee in'a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of
which is contingent upon the 'securing of a divorce or upon the amount of
alimony, maintenance, support, or property settlement, provided this
does not apply to liquidated sums in arrearage; or
(2) A contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may
be made only if:
(1) (a) The division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer or,
(b) By written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint
'responsibility for the representation; and
(2) The client is advised of and does not object to the participation of
all the lawyers involved; and
(3) The total fee is reasonable.
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INDEX
Acceptance of case. decision concernm" 5-
7
client relations, 5
collectability, 7
dammged~ennmatlon,6
liability detenninatlon, 5-6
sma11 cases, 7
Accident reconstiuctlonlsts,
see Ezpert Witnesses
AppUcation for Insurance benefits, 65
Apportionment of UabWty, 19-21
Avowals, 56-57
Battery, 11
Blackout defense, 14
Board of Claims. Kentucky, 12
CUe evaluation, 35-37
Cue In chlef, 56-57
CertlBcate ofnotlftcatlon ofln.urer, 25, 32,
60
CHent relations, 5
Closln, argument, 58-59
Collateral.ource rule, 21-22
CollectabWty,7
ColUslon Insurance, 23
Comparative fault, 12-13
Complaint, 39, 61
Con8ortlum, 108. of, 15, 19
Contlnlency fees, contract for contingency,
67
Contract, 67
Contributory neaUgence, 12-13
C~~iDatlon,57
D&llUlles, 16-22; see also specific items of
damage, this index
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Decision to me sult, 39
Defenses. eUmiDatlon of, 41
Demonatratlve evidence, 48-49
Depositions
defendant, 41-42
eyewitnesses, 41-42
experts, 42-43
plaintiff,43-44
DIscovery, 24-25, 41-44: see also Depositions;
Interrogatories; Requests for Admls-
.Ion
Dramshop cases, 11
Duty,8-9
Earning capacity. Impairment of, 17
Economists, see Ezpert Witnesses
Employment information, forms, 2-3, 68
Engineers, see Ezpert Witnesses
EzbJ.blts,48-49
Ezpert witnesses, 4, 14, 34-35, 41-43, 46-48
Fees, 2-3, 6, 67
FUlng sult, 39-40
Hedonic damages, 18
Income. lost, 16-17
Inltlallntervlewwlth cHent, 1-4,34
conduct, 1-2
fees and expenses, 2-4, 6, 67
fonns, signing of, 2-3
lD8urance
generally,5,23-31,34,39,41
benefits, application for, 65
collision insurance, 23
discovery of insurance infonnation, 24-
25
health, 22,39
liability insurance, 23-25, 30, 38llfe, 22
no-fault insurance, 15, 21, 27-31,39
notice to insurer of claJrn, 25, 32, 60
omnibus clause, 24
subrogatlon, 30, 40
undertnsuredmotorist insurance, 26-
27
uninsured motorist insurance,· 25-26
lIlsurer, DOtlflcatlOD of, 32, 60
Intentional torts, 11
Inteno,atorlesand otherwritten requests,
41
IDvesU,atlon, 32-34
Juror information .heets, 52
Jury instructions, 8,30-31,47,57-58
Jury selection, 52, 55-56
LlabWty
apportionment of, 19-21
determining, 5-6
insurance, 23-25
issues, 8-15
LlmltatiODS, 15
Loss of consortium, 15, 19
Lost Income, 3, 16-17,21,27-28,47-48
Medical bills, 16
MecUcal ezpense., 16-21,27-28,37,47-48
MecUcaI proof, at trial, 36-37, 50-51
MecUcaI records, 2-3, 34-35,48,51,64
MInors, 10, 19
Miscellaneous actions, 11-12
Motions In Umlne, 51-52
Negll&ence
generally, 9-10
imputed, 10
joint, 10
minor's, 10
per se, 10
proof of, 25
safety statute, violation of, 10
see also specific claims and defenses,
this index
No-fault Insurance, 15,21,27-31
Openln& statement, 45, 52-53, 56
92
Pain and suffering, 17-18,28
Physicians, 50-51, 57; see also Ezpert Wlt-
Duses; Medical Records
Pleadings, 39-40
Ponce report, 1, 32-33
Pre-fIl1DI procedures, 32-38
case evaluation, 35-37
investigation, 32-34 ·
medical records, 34-.35
notification of insurer, 32
settlement, 37-38
Pre-trial memoranda, 47
Process, service of, 40
Product UabiHty, 11-12
Property damage, 6,16
Punitive damages, 18-19
Requests for admission, 41
Roads, Improperly built or maintained, 12
Seat belt defense, 13-14
Service of process, 40
SetUement, 20, 29,37-38,45
Statute of Umltatlons, 15
Subpoenas,46
Sum~Judgment,49
Transportation Cabinet, Kentucky, 12,48
TrlaI date, 45-46
TrlaI preparation, 45-53
TrIals
generally,54
avowals, 56-57
case in chief, 56-57
closing argument, 13,58-59
cross-examination, 57; seealsoEzpert
Witnesses
date, setting, 45-46
jUry deliberations, 48-49
jUry instructions, 57-58
jUry selection, 55-56
opening statement, 56
trial date, 45-46
use of theme, primacy. simplicity.
forcefulness. honesty. 54-55
voir dire, 52
UnderlDsared motorist Insurance. 26-27
Unfair Clalma settlement Practices Act, 38
UDlDsured motorist Insurance, 25-26
Voir cUre, 52
Wille authorizations, 2-3, 68
Willes, loss of, 16-17.21.27-28,47-48
Wltnesse•• 32-33.41-43.45-46
Wltne.. llsts, 46
Wroneful death, 12. 19
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